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Edited by Phyllis Schiller Myers
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Bargaining Theory

The Role of Negotiator Aspirations and Settlement Expectancies in Bargaining Outcomes, by Sally Blount White (University of Chicago) and Margaret A. Neale (Northwestern University)

The following paper offers a framework and empirical test of the importance of negotiators' aspiration levels and settlement expectancies on negotiated outcomes. In particular, we demonstrate that, in the presence of a stable bargaining zone, negotiators' aspirations significantly affect negotiated outcomes. Further, we find that asymmetries in negotiators' aspirations with respect to the bargaining zone are a source of inefficiency in bargaining, i.e., asymmetries increase the likelihood of impasse in the presence of a positive bargaining zone. We also present data which examine the role of settlement expectancies as another source of settlement inefficiency. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, February 1994, 57(2): 303-317. (Reprinted with permission of Academic Press, Inc.)

The Impact of Alternatives to Settlement in Dyadic Negotiation, by Robin L. Pinkley (Southern Methodist University), Margaret A. Neale, and Rebecca J. Bennett (Northwestern University)

This study examines how differential power among negotiators (in the form of alternatives available to the individuals if the parties fail to reach a negotiated settlement) influences the parameters (e.g., the aspiration levels and reservation prices), the process, and the outcome of the negotiation. The results suggest that (a) the possession of an alternative increases one's own outcome as well as joint outcome; (b) the more attractive or valuable the alternative, the greater the benefits regarding own and joint outcome; and (c) the better one's own alternative relative to the other parties' alternative, the larger one's piece of the resource pie (i.e., one's benefit increases). *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, January 1994, 57(1): 97-116. (Reprinted with permission of Academic Press, Inc.)