(Katholieke Universiteit Leuvan, Belgium, and University of Amsterdam), and F. Delbaen (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)

By means of Wiener processes, randomness in interest rates for annuities can be modelled. This paper wants to give an expression for the Laplace transform of annuities certain, when time is exponentially distributed. *Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,* December 1992, 11(4): 291-294. (Reprinted with permission of North-Holland Publishing Company.)

The Impact of Government Social Security Payments on the Annuity Market, by Simon Power (Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada) and Peter G. C. Townley (Acadia University, Wolfville, Canada)

This paper analyzes the impact of government social security payments to retirees on the overall average expenditure on annuities per retiree. More specifically, we examine how increasing levels of social security payments 'crowd-out' the private sector annuity market. We also investigate the implications of outlawing gender discrimination in this market. The particular model we utilize is motivated in large part by the Canadian experience, but the results hold more generally. *Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,* February 1993, 12(1): 47-56. (Reprinted with permission of North-Holland Publishing Company.)

INSURER MANAGEMENT

Whose Interests Do Hired Top Managers Pursue? An Examination of Select Mutual and Stock Life Insurers, by Mark Kroll (University of Texas at Tyler), Peter Wright (Memphis State University), and Pochera Theerathorn (Memphis State University)

In this article theoretical and empirical explorations that have addressed the question, Whose interests do top managers pursue? are synthesized and grouped under two categories. Based on the review of the literature, three propositions are tested on two groups of organizations—mutual insurers and stock insurers. The results of the study lend support to the premise that top executives do not necessarily act in the best interests of owners. *Journal of Business Research,* February 1993, 26(2): 133-148. (Reprinted with permission of Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc.)

LIABILITY RULES

Ambiguity and Liability Negotiations: The Effects of the Negotiators' Role and the Sensitivity Zone, by Cynthia S. Fobian (University of Iowa and Starr and Associates) and Jay J. J. Christensen-Szalanski (University of Iowa)

This research applies the Einhorn-Hogarth ambiguity model to a two-party negotiation situation involving medical liability cases. In the first study, subjects who were assigned to the role of a defendant or a plaintiff in a medical liability case altered their out-of-court settlement offers according to the estimated likelihood of winning the case at trial, the amount of ambiguity associated with that estimate, and the importance of the case ($p < .05$). As predicted by the Einhorn-Hogarth model, the effect of ambiguity on defendant subjects facing a potential loss differed ($p < .05$) from its effect on plaintiff subjects facing a potential gain. The second study used the model to show that increasing the amount of ambiguity in negotiation situations can make the potential for a settlement less sensitive to parties having substantially different perspectives of their chances of winning at trial. These predictions were supported in an actual negotiation context. When each party had a very different estimate of the plaintiff winning the trial ($p = .20$ vs. $p = .80$), there were two to five times more settlements when there was much ambiguity than when there was little ambiguity ($p < .001$). These results provide further support for the Einhorn-Hogarth ambiguity model. They also show that contrary to popular belief, increasing ambiguity in a negotiation context can increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* March 1993, 54(2): 277-298. (Reprinted with permission of *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.*)