

Rewriting History

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ABSTRACT

We document widespread changes to the historical I/B/E/S analyst stock recommendations database. Across seven I/B/E/S downloads, obtained between 2000 and 2007, we find that between 6,580 (1.6%) and 97,582 (21.7%) of matched observations are different from one download to the next. The changes include alterations of recommendations, additions and deletions of records, and removal of analyst names. These changes are nonrandom, clustering by analyst reputation, broker size and status, and recommendation boldness, and affect trading signal classifications and back-tests of three stylized facts: profitability of trading signals, profitability of consensus recommendation changes, and persistence in individual analyst stock-picking ability.

DATA ARE THE BEDROCK OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH in finance. When there are questions about the accuracy or completeness of a data source, researchers routinely go to great lengths to investigate measurement error, selection bias, or reliability.¹ But what if the very contents of a historical database were to change, in error, over time? Such changes to the historical record would have important implications for empirical research. They could undermine the principle of replicability, which in the absence of controlled experiments is the foundation of empirical research in finance. They could result in over- or underestimates of the magnitudes of empirical effects, leading researchers down blind alleys. Also, to the extent that financial-market participants

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¹ See, for instance, Rosenberg and Houglet (1974), Bennis (1980), Shumway (1997), Canina et al. (1998), Shumway and Warther (1999), and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001). See <http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/rc/crsp-cstat-references.htm> for a summary of academic work on problems with financial databases.

use academic research for trading purposes, they could lead to resource misallocation.

Data vendors have little obvious incentive to deliberately change the historical record. However, maintaining large databases of historical records is both costly and technologically demanding, not least in the wake of mergers among data vendors. Given that demand for long time-series of accurate historical financial data (as opposed to real-time information) has traditionally come mainly from academics, who typically pay discounted usage fees,² one should not take the integrity of historical data for granted.

In this paper we demonstrate that the integrity of historical financial data is an important issue for empiricists to consider. On May 22, 2007, and in reaction to an earlier version of this paper, Thomson Financial ("Thomson") began issuing confidential guidance to select clients regarding the integrity of its I/B/E/S historical detail recommendations database.³ This database contains investment ratings for U.S. listed companies issued by sell-side analysts at most of the brokerage firms active in the United States. The substance of the guidance, summarized in the Appendix, is that tens of thousands of historical recommendations have inadvertently been added, dropped, or altered, and that the data handling errors that apparently led to these changes have occurred throughout the existence of the database (beginning before 2000 and continuing through the end of 2006). As a result, the actual contents of the recommendations database depend on the precise date when a client downloaded the data. In other words, two clients interested in the same historical time period, who obtained the data on different dates, would likely have analyzed two quite different sets of data.

We explore the implications of these problems for academic research. The academic literature on analyst stock recommendations, much of which uses I/B/E/S data, is voluminous.⁴ Michaely and Womack (2005), in their review of the literature, note that several key topics are the subject of numerous academic papers. These topics include the compensation, incentives, and biases of analysts; the characteristics of recommended stocks; the investment value of recommendations; and biases and conflicts of interest in the production of recommendations. Given this keen academic interest, as well as the intense scrutiny that research analysts face in the marketplace and from regulators, and the growing popularity of trading strategies based on analyst output, changes to the historical I/B/E/S database are of obvious interest to academics and practitioners alike.

We document that the historical contents of the I/B/E/S recommendations database have been quite unstable over time. Across a sequence of seven nearly annual downloads of the entire I/B/E/S historical recommendations database, obtained between 2000 and 2007, we find that between 1.6% and 21.7% of

² The recent rise in popularity of quantitative investment strategies may have increased demand for historical data.

³ The guidance is available only to clients, only on request, and only upon signing of a non-disclosure agreement. Thomson has shared its findings with us, and we are not bound by any non-disclosure agreement, though we are unable to quote verbatim from Thomson's report. Interested readers who are Thomson clients are advised to obtain the report directly from Thomson.

⁴ As of September 4, 2008, Google Scholar identifies 1,110 articles and working papers using the keywords "I/B/E/S," "analysts," and "recommendations."

matched observations are different from one download to the next. For instance, of the 332,145 observations on the 2003 tape, 57,770 (17.4%) are changed in some manner on the 2004 tape. We identify four types of changes, which we term alterations, deletions, additions, and anonymizations. For instance, comparing the 2003 tape to the 2004 tape over the period 1993 to 2003, we find 2,411 instances of alterations to a recommendation level (e.g., turning a “buy” into a “hold”), 3,965 deletions (i.e., records on the 2003 tape that have been deleted from the 2004 tape), 33,335 additions (i.e., records dated 1993–2003 that appear on the 2004 tape but not on the 2003 tape), and 18,059 instances in which the analyst’s name subsequently went missing from a recommendation. Across all tapes, we find 15,828 alterations, 131,413 deletions, 74,214 additions, and 23,838 anonymizations.

Thomson regards, the 2007 tape as purged of the data errors we have identified,⁵ except that it continues to include alterations made as a result of brokers’ requests for retrospective changes to their buy/hold/sell recommendation scales. When we undo these retrospective changes to create a true “as-was” 2007 tape, we find that between 10% (on the 2005 tape) and 30% (on the 2004 tape) of all observations are now recorded differently on the 2007 tape. For instance, of the 332,145 records on the 2003 tape, 10,850 appear on the 2007 tape with a corrected recommendation level, 13,892 have been permanently erased from the I/B/E/S historical database, 5,489 records missing from the 2003 tape have been added, and analysts’ names have been reinstated in 6,259 records.

We demonstrate that these changes have a significant and economically important effect on several features of the data that are routinely used by academics and practitioners.

1. *Effect on the distribution of recommendations:* Relative to the 2007 tape, recommendations affected by the changes on the 2000, 2001, and 2002 tapes are too optimistic, while those on the 2003, 2004, and 2005 tapes are too pessimistic.
2. *Patterns in affected recommendations:* The changes cluster according to three widely used conditioning variables: the analyst’s reputation, the brokerage firm’s size and status, and the boldness of the recommendation. “All-star” analysts and brokerage firms sanctioned under the Global Settlement are overrepresented among affected recommendations on the 2000 and 2001 tapes and underrepresented on later tapes. “Bold” recommendations (those far from consensus) are overrepresented among affected recommendations on all tapes.
3. *Effect on trading signals:* Trading signals such as “upgrades” and “downgrades” are the key inputs for a large literature on the economic impact and profitability of analyst research (see Ramnath, Rock, and Shane (2005) for a survey). Depending on the tape, we find that between 2.7% and 23.6% of historic trading signals are reclassified on the 2007 tape.

⁵ Unrelated to our investigation into the causes of the changes to the recommendations database, Thomson has decided to cease providing a mapping between analyst codes and analyst names for its earning forecast database. However, Thomson continues to provide such a mapping for the recommendations database.

We illustrate the potential effects these changes can have on research by examining three central tests from the empirical analyst literature: the profitability of trading signals, the profitability of consensus recommendation changes, and the persistence in individual analyst performance. We find that the changes to the I/B/E/S historical record have an economically and statistically significant impact on both calendar-time portfolio returns and 3-day event returns to trading signals computed from the different downloads. For example, 3-day event returns to upgrades average 3.02% on the 2007 tape but only 2.30% on the 2004 tape (a difference of 72 basis points over 3 days and a 31% increase in percentage terms), while 3-day event returns to downgrades average -4.72% on the 2007 tape but only -3.79% on the 2004 tape (a difference of 93 basis points and a 24% decrease). The performance of portfolio strategies based on changes in consensus recommendations (as in Jegadeesh et al. (2004)) shows similar variation across tapes. For instance, we document a temporary boost to the pre-2001 back-testing performance of such strategies on the 2003, 2004, and 2005 tapes relative to the 2002 tape, a boost that then vanishes on the 2007 tape.

The track records of individual analysts are also affected. Analysts' track records are the key variable of interest in several strands of the literature, notably the debate over conflicts of interest⁶ in the analyst industry, as well as studies of individual analysts' stock-picking skill. We perform a standard test of persistence in analysts' stock-picking ability on each of our tapes. This test reveals that the 2001–2005 I/B/E/S downloads produce inflated estimates of persistence compared with the adjusted 2007 tape.

Taken together, our findings suggest that the pervasive data changes we document in this paper do not simply increase noise; because they have systematic and persistent components, they can and do affect the size of estimated effects. Although we take comfort in the fact that the three tests we examine are generally not overturned directionally across the tapes we examine, the magnitude and significance of the across-tape variation is still disconcerting. Since we did not search over all possible tests using analyst recommendation data, we cannot say to what extent different stylized facts in the literature may or may not be affected by these changes to the historical record. What we can say with certainty is that as a result of our investigation, the quality of post-2006 data downloads will exceed that of any older downloads. Thus, an important lesson for empirical researchers is not to recycle older downloads, even if a fresh download requires substantial investment in routine data cleaning.⁷ With regard to “undoing” the broker-requested *retrospective* changes to recommendation scales, we can also report that Thomson is now planning to produce a true “as-was” historical recommendations database in response to our investigation. This should allow

⁶ See, for example, Michaely and Womack (1999), Lin and McNichols (1998), and Hong and Kubik (2003), among others. As of September 4, 2008, Google Scholar lists 285 articles and working papers containing the key words “analysts,” “conflicts of interest,” and “I/B/E/S.”

⁷ For example, I/B/E/S periodically changes its historical broker (bmasked) and analyst (amaskcd) codes; so, programs that adjust for broker mergers or that track analysts across brokers typically need updating after every fresh download.

future researchers to consistently and accurately replicate any analysis that employs historical analyst recommendations data.

I. Overview of Changes to the I/B/E/S Historical Recommendations Database

A. Scope of the Problem

Our analysis is based on comparisons of seven snapshots of the entire I/B/E/S U.S. historical detail recommendations database, downloaded at roughly annual intervals between 2000 and 2007. Each snapshot covers the period from the inception of the database (October 29, 1993) to about 2 months prior to the respective download date. The cutoff dates of our snapshots are 7/20/00 (“2000 tape”), 1/24/02 (“2001 tape”), 7/18/02 (“2002 tape”), 3/20/03 (“2003 tape”), 3/18/04 (“2004 tape”), 12/15/05 (“2005 tape”), and 9/20/07 (“2007 tape”). According to Thomson, the 2007 tape contains data purged of all data errors we have identified, except that it continues to include alterations made as a result of broker requests for retrospective changes to their recommendation scales.

A typical I/B/E/S record includes the analyst’s name and her six-digit amasked identifier as assigned by I/B/E/S, the name of the analyst’s employer at the time of the recommendation, the I/B/E/S ticker and historical CUSIP of the company concerned, the date the recommendation was issued, the last date it was considered still in force, and the recommendation itself. Different brokerage firms use different wordings for their recommendations, which I/B/E/S translates into a numerical score on the following scale: strong buy = 1, buy = 2, hold = 3, sell = 4, strong sell = 5.

Table I, Panel A examines year-over-year changes to the database by comparing data from adjacent annual downloads, which are merged by standardized brokerage firm code,⁸ I/B/E/S ticker, and recommendation date. We focus on the period for which each pair of downloads has overlapping coverage (that is, we ignore recommendations from the later tape dated after the cutoff date of the earlier tape). Thus, we ask if two researchers, looking at the same time period but working with data obtained on slightly different dates, would face materially different data.

Panel A (Table I) reveals a disturbingly high incidence of ex post changes to the I/B/E/S recommendations data. Across our sequence of tapes, 10.8%, 8.4%, 13.1%, 17.4%, 21.7%, and 1.6% of observations are changed by our next download date. For instance, of the 450,225 observations on the 2004 tape, 97,582 (21.7%) look different on the 2005 tape. This indicates that the historical contents of the I/B/E/S recommendations database have been quite unstable over time. Only since about December 2005 has the database been relatively stable, with only 6,580 historic observations (1.6%) being changed by September 2007.

⁸ In some cases, I/B/E/S uses multiple codes to identify the same brokerage firm (e.g., NOMURA and NOMURAUS both decode to Nomura Securities). We standardize such name variations before merging the downloads.

Table I
Overview of Changes to the I/B/E/S Recommendations History

The table documents the extent, types, and time profile of changes to the I/B/E/S historical recommendations database. In Panel A, we examine year-over-year changes to the database by comparing data from adjacent annual downloads. We focus on the period for which each pair of downloads has overlapping coverage (that is, we ignore recommendations from the later tape that are dated after the cutoff date of the earlier tape). The cutoff dates of our tapes are 7/20/00 ("2000 tape"), 1/24/02 ("2001 tape"), 7/18/02 ("2002 tape"), 3/20/03 ("2003 tape"), 3/18/04 ("2004 tape"), 12/15/05 ("2005 tape"), and 9/20/07 ("2007 tape"). According to Thomson, the 2007 tape contains data purged of all data errors we have identified, except that it continues to include broker-requested retrospective changes to recommendation scales. In Panel B, we compare the 2000 through 2005 tapes with the 2007 tape, after reversing the broker-requested retrospective changes to recommendation scales. This adjusted version of the 2007 tape corresponds to the "as-was" historical recommendations database that Thomson intends to make available to researchers in response to our investigation. The comparisons in Panel B therefore show the extent to which the earlier tapes were contaminated by data errors compared to the most accurate available historic record. We define an *alteration* as a broker/ticker/date triad that appears on both tapes but for which the recommendation on one tape is different from that on the other tape. A *deletion* is a broker/ticker/date triad that appears on the earlier tape but not on the later tape to which it is compared. An *addition* is a broker/ticker/date triad that appears on the later comparison tape but not on the earlier tape. In Panel A, *anonymizations* refer to cases where the analyst associated with a broker/ticker/date triad is identified by name on the earlier tape but is anonymous on the later tape. In Panel B, *de-anonymizations* refer to cases where the analyst associated with a broker/ticker/date triad is identified by name on the 2007 tape but is anonymous on the earlier tape. We make this switch because as of September 2007, Thomson has not only reversed the anonymizations shown in Panel A but has also added analyst names for 28,199 broker/ticker/date triads that originally appeared without names on the earlier tapes.

Panel A: Breakdown of Types of Changes in Adjacent Annual Downloads

Comparison Tapes	No. of Obs. on Earlier Tape	All ex post Changes		Alterations		Deletions		Additions		Anonymizations	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
2000 vs. 2001	222,694	24,116	10.8	2,241	1.0	13,049	5.9	8,647	3.9	179	0.1
2001 vs. 2002	266,619	22,473	8.4	493	0.2	13,302	5.0	8,661	3.2	17	0.0
2002 vs. 2003	280,567	36,762	13.1	8,973	3.2	4,318	1.5	18,471	6.6	5,000	1.8
2003 vs. 2004	332,145	57,770	17.4	2,411	0.7	3,965	1.2	33,335	10.0	18,059	5.4
2004 vs. 2005	450,225	97,582	21.7	1,589	0.4	92,244	20.5	3,208	0.7	541	0.1
2005 vs. 2007	414,881	6,580	1.6	121	0.0	4,535	1.1	1,892	0.5	32	0.0

Panel B: Breakdown of Types of Changes Relative to Adjusted 2007 Tape

Comparison Tapes	No. of Obs. on Earlier Tape	All ex post Changes		Alterations		Deletions		Additions		De- Anonymizations	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
2000 vs. 2007	222,694	29,101	13.1	1,531	0.7	14,281	6.4	13,065	5.9	224	0.1
2001 vs. 2007	266,619	46,217	17.3	2,178	0.8	19,819	7.4	23,714	8.9	506	0.2
2002 vs. 2007	280,567	33,982	12.1	2,265	0.8	11,395	4.1	19,756	7.0	566	0.2
2003 vs. 2007	332,145	36,490	11.0	10,850	3.3	13,892	4.2	5,489	1.7	6,259	1.9
2004 vs. 2007	450,225	135,042	30.0	12,682	2.8	96,077	21.3	4,381	1.0	21,902	4.9
2005 vs. 2007	414,881	41,516	10.0	12,522	3.0	4,535	1.1	1,889	0.5	22,570	5.4

Panel A (Table I) also provides a breakdown of the following four types of ex post changes:

1. *Alterations*: A broker/ticker/date triad that appears on both tapes but for which the recommendation on one tape is different from that on the next tape.
2. *Deletions*: A broker/ticker/date triad that appears on the earlier tape but not on the later tape.
3. *Additions*: A broker/ticker/date triad that appears on the later tape but not on the earlier tape.
4. *Anonymizations*: Cases in which the analyst associated with a broker/ticker/date triad is identified by name on the earlier tape but is anonymous on the later tape.

The number of alterations varies from 121 (between the 2005 and 2007 tapes) to 8,973 (between the 2002 and 2003 tapes). Deletions run in the thousands for every pairwise comparison, peaking in 2005 when 92,244 records—20.5% of the 450,225 records on the 2004 tape—were deleted. Additions also run in the thousands, peaking at 33,335 between 2003 and 2004. Finally, anonymizations are concentrated between 2002 and 2004: between 2002 and 2003, 5,000 records were anonymized, followed by a further 18,059 anonymizations between 2003 and 2004.

The evidence in Panel A (Table I) suggests that two researchers downloading I/B/E/S recommendations a few months apart could face materially different data. However, this does not speak to the question of how inaccurate these data might be. Answering that question requires that we compare each download with the “truth.” To the extent that the 2007 tape corrects errors arising from accidental deletions and anonymizations, Thomson considers it the most historically accurate record of analyst recommendations. However, the 2007 tape still contains broker-requested *retrospective* changes to recommendation scales; so, we reverse these alterations to get back to original, historical data.⁹ We refer to this as the “adjusted 2007 tape.” In Panel B, we compare each tape to the adjusted 2007 tape to illustrate the extent to which the six earlier tapes were contaminated by data problems.

Panel B (Table I) points to extensive data problems in each of the earlier tapes. Between 10.0% and 30.0% of the observations on the respective tapes have been corrected on the adjusted 2007 tape. For instance, of the 450,225 records on the 2004 tape, 12,682 appear on the adjusted 2007 tape with a different recommendation level (either because Thomson corrected data errors or, more often, because we undid retrospective rating scale changes), 96,077 are no longer included in the I/B/E/S historical database as of 2007, and 4,381 records that should have been on the 2004 tape (but were not), have been added on the 2007 tape. In addition, 21,902 records that were

⁹ This adjusted version of the 2007 tape corresponds to the “as-was” historical recommendations database that Thomson intends to make available to researchers in response to our investigation.

anonymous on the 2004 tape identify the analyst by name on the 2007 tape.¹⁰

It is worth noting that the I/B/E/S recommendations database appears to have had the most data problems precisely around the time (namely, in 2001 and 2004) when academic interest in analyst recommendations increased in the wake of first Regulation FD and then the Global Settlement.

B. Net Effect of Changes on the Distribution of Recommendations

Table I illustrates that the I/B/E/S recommendations history has changed extensively throughout its existence. We now investigate whether these changes merely add noise to standard empirical tests or whether they are liable to create biases. Under the null that the changes are pure noise, we expect that they leave the recommendation levels of affected records unchanged, on average.

Table II suggests that the changes to the I/B/E/S recommendations database have nonrandom components, both year-over-year (Panel A) and relative to the adjusted 2007 tape (Panel B). In four of the pairwise comparisons shown in Panel A (2000 vs. 2001, 2002 vs. 2003, 2003 vs. 2004, and 2005 vs. 2007), the net effect of the changes is to make the recommendations history look less optimistic. For instance, the average recommendation on the 2002 tape is 2.11 (a little below a “buy” recommendation). The 36,762 records subject to an ex post change have an average recommendation of 1.98 on the 2002 tape. On the 2003 tape, their average is significantly more pessimistic (mean: 2.28), largely because the 2003 deletions are unusually optimistic (mean: 1.63), whereas the 2003 additions are unusually pessimistic (mean: 2.45). In the two remaining pairwise comparisons (2001 vs. 2002 and 2004 vs. 2005), the net effect of the changes is to make the recommendations history look more optimistic.

Relative to the adjusted 2007 tape, which we regard as more historically accurate, changed recommendations on the first three tapes are too optimistic (i.e., the effect of the corrections on the 2007 tape is to lower the average of these recommendations) while those on the last three tapes are too pessimistic. As we will show in Section II, these apparently systematic patterns in changed recommendations have a direct impact on standard empirical tests.

C. Patterns in Affected Recommendations

In addition to being either systematically optimistic or pessimistic, recommendations affected by the changes to the I/B/E/S recommendations history appear to cluster according to three popular conditioning variables: the analyst's reputation, the brokerage firm's size and status, and the boldness of the recommendation. We measure analyst reputation using all-star status, as

¹⁰ The 2007 tape not only reverses all the 23,828 anonymizations shown in Panel A (Table I), but also adds analyst names for 28,199 broker/ticker/date triads that originally appeared without names on the earlier tapes. While welcome, such “de-anonymizations” may affect the replicability of tests that rely on tracking analysts (e.g., models of career concerns).

Table II
Mean Recommendation Levels by Type of Change

The table reports mean recommendation levels among changed recommendations. In Panel A, changes are defined by reference to the next available tape. In Panel B, changes are defined by reference to the adjusted 2007 tape, after reversing the broker-requested retrospective changes to recommendation scales on the 2007 tape; see Table I. Recommendations are scored by I/B/E/S on a five-point scale, where 1 = strong buy and 5 = sell. We test for differences in mean recommendations using standard two-sample *F*-tests. The tests compare mean recommendation levels among changed recommendations before and after the changes (column (1) vs. (2) and column (3) vs. (4)). In the last two columns, we compare average recommendation levels among deletions and additions (column (5) vs. (6)). Under the null that the changes affecting the I/B/E/S recommendations history are pure noise, we expect to find no significant changes in recommendation levels. Statistically significant differences in recommendation levels at the 5% level are indicated with *.

Comparison Tapes	No. of Obs on Earlier Tape	Average Rec.	No. of ex post Changes	Average Rec. (All Changes)		Average Rec. (Alterations Only)		Average Rec.	
				Before	After	Before	After	Deletions	Additions
				(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A									
2000 vs. 2001	222,694	2.11	24,116	2.28*	2.41*	2.03*	2.68*	2.33	2.35
2001 vs. 2002	266,619	2.11	22,473	2.28*	2.08*	1.74*	2.34*	2.30*	2.06*
2002 vs. 2003	280,567	2.11	36,762	1.98*	2.28*	2.07*	2.01*	1.63*	2.45*
2003 vs. 2004	332,145	2.18	57,770	2.17*	2.70*	1.79*	2.34*	2.49*	3.01*
2004 vs. 2005	450,225	2.36	97,582	2.89*	1.78*	1.42*	2.10*	2.92*	1.54*
2005 vs. 2007	414,881	2.24	6,580	2.15*	2.36*	1.98*	2.89*	2.15*	2.33*
Panel B									
2000 vs. 2007	222,694	2.11	29,101	2.16*	2.30*	1.89*	2.15*	2.20*	2.33*
2001 vs. 2007	266,619	2.11	46,217	2.23*	2.28*	2.47*	2.15*	2.21*	2.29*
2002 vs. 2007	280,567	2.11	33,982	2.24*	2.38*	2.64*	1.98*	2.18*	2.44*
2003 vs. 2007	332,145	2.18	36,490	2.22*	2.07*	2.03*	2.08*	2.39*	1.93*
2004 vs. 2007	450,225	2.36	135,042	2.68*	2.06*	2.03*	1.99*	2.89*	1.74*
2005 vs. 2007	414,881	2.24	41,516	2.13*	2.10*	2.09*	1.97*	2.15*	2.33*

designated in the October issue of *Institutional Investor* magazine, preceding the recommendation in question. We divide brokerage firms into the 12 (generally large) firms sanctioned under the Global Settlement and all other firms, and we code a recommendation as bold if it was one notch or more above or below consensus (= mean recommendation) computed over the prior 3 months (requiring at least three outstanding recommendations).

In Table IA.I available in Internet Appendix,¹¹ we compare the frequency of these conditioning variables in the universe of historical recommendations and in the set of changed recommendations. We compare each tape to the next tape as well as to the adjusted 2007 tape.

We find that all-stars are significantly overrepresented among changed recommendations on the 2000 and 2001 tapes, while changed recommendations on

¹¹ An Internet Appendix for this article is online in the "Supplements and Datasets" section at <http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp>.

the 2002–2004 tapes come disproportionately from unrated analysts. Relative to the adjusted 2007 tape, recommendations by unrated analysts are significantly more likely to need correction on every tape except the 2001 tape. Thus, tests comparing all-stars to unrated analysts may yield different results depending on which tape is used. Sanctioned banks are overrepresented among affected recommendations on the 2000 and 2001 tapes and underrepresented on all later tapes. Relative to the adjusted 2007 tape, sanctioned banks are associated with a significantly lower need for corrections on every tape except the 2001 tape. Finally, bold recommendations are significantly overrepresented among affected records on all tapes. They are also consistently and significantly more likely to be subject to corrections on the adjusted 2007 tape.

II. Impact on Typical Analyses of Stock Recommendations

In this section, we document the potential effects of the I/B/E/S changes for academic research, while bearing in mind that they may also affect the work of regulators, legislators, litigators, and investment professionals, who may also rely on archival databases such as I/B/E/S. We focus on three central findings of the analyst literature: the profitability of trading signals, the profitability of changes in consensus recommendations, and the persistence in individual analyst performance. We stress that we do *not* search over every possible result that might be impacted by the data changes, nor do we necessarily pick the results or the specifications that were most likely to be affected. Our goal is simply to assess if, and by how much, the changes to the historical record that we document might affect key stylized facts in the empirical analyst literature.

A. Effects on Trading Signal Classifications

Besides changing the distribution of recommendation levels, the alterations, deletions, and additions also affect recommendation changes or “trading signals,” the key inputs for a large literature on the profitability of analyst recommendations (see Ramnath et al. (2005) for a review). For each broker/ticker pair, we code trading signals as follows. The first time a broker recommends a stock is an initiation. Subsequent recommendations represent upgrades, downgrades, or reiterations, as long as no more than 12 months have elapsed since the previous recommendation.¹² Otherwise, they are coded as re-initiations. We also use the I/B/E/S stop file to check for suspensions of broker coverage and broker scale changes, and code resumptions of coverage as re-initiations.¹³

Table III provides a breakdown, for each tape, of the distributions of all trading signals and of those that are affected by the changes to the I/B/E/S database.

¹² We use the I/B/E/S field “revdats” to check whether the previous recommendation continues to be in effect.

¹³ When a scale change occurs, Thomson places a stop on the broker’s outstanding recommendations. After a day or so, recommendations are re-started at the new scale level in the detail recommendations file. Thus, in Table III we code the first recommendation after a scale change as a re-initiation.

Table III
Effect of Alterations, Deletions, and Additions on Trading Signals

We compare trading signals on the 2000 through 2005 tapes to the adjusted version of the 2007 tape, described in Table I. Tapes are matched by standardized brokerage firm name, I/B/E/S ticker, and recommendation date. Observations on the 2007 tape dated after the cutoff date of the earlier tape are ignored. Trading signals are constructed on a per-broker and per-I/B/E/S ticker basis using a 12-month look-back window. For instance, a downgrade is defined as a negative change from a recommendation issued by the same broker for the same I/B/E/S ticker within the previous 12 months. If the previous recommendation was issued more than 12 months ago or was stopped according to the I/B/E/S stop file, the current recommendation is defined to be a re-initiation. If there is no previous recommendation, the current recommendation is defined to be an initiation. The table also provides a transition matrix for the changed trading signals from the earlier tape to the 2007 tape.

Trading Signal as of Original Tape	Orig. Tape No.	All Changes		Trading Signal According to Adjusted 2007 Tape					
		No.	%	Downgrade	Upgrade	Re-iteration	Initiation	Re-initiation	Deleted
Panel A: Migrations in Trading Signals (2000 tape vs. 2007 tape)									
Downgrade	50,866	4,508	8.9		143	168	5	14	4,178
Upgrade	44,427	4,176	9.4	124		275	15	18	3,744
Re-iteration	10,957	2,549	23.3	522	606		36	22	1,363
Initiation	89,065	6,242	7.0	715	605	298		94	4,530
Re-initiation	27,379	1,262	4.6	344	335	115	2		466
Added by 2007		13,065		3,473	2,489	1,336	4,409	1,358	
All Signals	222,694	31,802	14.3	5,178	4,178	2,192	4,467	1,506	14,281
Panel B: Migrations in Trading Signals (2001 tape vs. 2007 tape)									
Downgrade	65,403	6,988	10.7		125	536	13	37	6,277
Upgrade	52,831	5,859	11.1	68		492	8	31	5,260
Re-iteration	12,901	3,417	26.5	433	939		25	19	2,001
Initiation	100,605	7,671	7.6	585	911	431		114	5,630
Re-initiation	34,879	2,073	5.9	489	544	389	0		651
Added by 2007		23,714		7,043	3,725	1,511	7,324	4,111	
All Signals	266,619	49,722	18.6	8,618	6,244	3,359	7,370	4,312	19,819

(continued)

Table III—Continued

Trading Signal as of Original Tape	Orig. Tape No.	All Changes		Trading Signal According to Adjusted 2007 Tape					
		No.	%	Downgrade	Upgrade	Re-iteration	Initiation	Re-initiation	Deleted
Panel C: Migrations in Trading Signals (2002 tape vs. 2007 tape)									
Downgrade	67,912	4,110	6.1		149	522	22	64	3,353
Upgrade	54,155	3,254	6.0	68		517	21	65	2,583
Re-iteration	14,127	3,042	21.5	510	1,234		43	74	1,181
Initiation	103,462	6,276	6.1	673	1,188	532		136	3,747
Re-initiation	40,911	2,280	5.6	550	738	450	11		531
Added by 2007		19,756		6,161	2,668	1,583	6,688	2,656	
All signals	280,567	38,718	13.8	7,962	5,977	3,604	6,785	2,995	11,395
Panel D: Migrations in Trading Signals (2003 tape vs. 2007 tape)									
Downgrade	79,772	4,027	5.0		18	560	12	22	3,415
Upgrade	62,108	3,200	5.2	61		520	10	22	2,587
Re-iteration	21,632	5,234	24.2	1,552	1,254		53	57	2,318
Initiation	111,577	4,421	4.0	434	9	36		15	3,927
Re-initiation	57,056	1,865	3.3	187	10	23	0		1,645
Added by 2007		5,489		768	1,364	365	1,444	1,548	
All Signals	332,145	24,236	7.3	3,002	2,655	1,504	1,519	1,664	13,892
Panel E: Migrations in Trading Signals (2004 tape vs. 2007 tape)									
Downgrade	111,370	26,609	23.9		14	612	5	2	25,976
Upgrade	94,072	27,341	29.1	48		570	2	7	26,714
Re-iteration	35,073	16,217	46.2	1,937	1,587		33	29	12,631
Initiation	143,546	28,877	20.1	450	14	45		17	28,351
Re-initiation	66,164	2,711	4.1	209	41	56	0		2,405
Added by 2007		4,381		703	1,305	292	1,299	782	
All Signals	450,225	106,136	23.6	3,347	2,961	1,575	1,339	837	96,077

(continued)

Table III—Continued

Trading Signal as of Original Tape	Orig. Tape No.	All Changes		Trading Signal According to Adjusted 2007 Tape					
		No.	%	Downgrade	Upgrade	Re-iteration	Initiation	Re-initiation	Deleted
Panel F: Migrations in Trading Signals (2005 tape vs. 2007 tape)									
Downgrade	103,086	2,045	2.0		14	567	3	2	1,459
Upgrade	82,579	1,625	2.0	16		535	4	1	1,069
Re-iteration	26,347	3,955	15.0	1,735	1,626		29	28	537
Initiation	130,502	1,295	1.0	3	6	18		1	1,267
Re-initiation	72,367	218	0.3	0	4	11	0		203
Added by 2007		1,889		520	458	113	438	360	
All signals	414,881	11,027	2.7	2,274	2,108	1,244	474	392	4,535

For instance, of the 222,694 trading signals on the 2000 tape shown in Panel A, 18,737 (31,802 changes less 13,065 additions) are subject to corrections according to the adjusted 2007 tape. When we add the 13,065 additions, we find that 14.3% of the trading signals are different on the 2007 tape from the 2000 tape, for the exact same time period. The breakdown by type of trading signal shows that 8.9% of the downgrades on the 2000 tape are coded differently on the adjusted 2007 tape, as are 9.4% of upgrades, 23.3% of re-iterations, 7% of initiations, and 4.6% of re-initiations.

The right-hand side of Table III provides a transition matrix for the changed trading signals from the earlier tape to the 2007 tape. For instance, 522 recommendations classified as re-iterations on the 2000 tape have become downgrades on the 2007 tape, 143 downgrades have become upgrades, and 275 upgrades have become re-iterations.

Panels B–F (Table III) repeat these analyses for the 2001–2005 tapes. In each case, a large fraction of trading signals change, ranging from 2.7% on the 2005 tape to 23.6% on the 2004 tape.

B. Effects on Returns to Trading on Upgrades and Downgrades

What is the likely effect of these changes to historic trading signals on backtests of the profitability of strategies that condition on upgrades and downgrades? For brevity, we focus on the 2004 and adjusted 2007 tapes, as this is sufficient to illustrate our main point, although we find large and significant differences across a variety of additional pairwise comparisons.

For each tape, we form two portfolios: (1) an upgrade portfolio, consisting of all stocks that at least one analyst upgraded on a given date (e.g., from a buy to a strong buy); and (2) a downgrade portfolio, comprising all stocks that at least one analyst downgraded on a given date (e.g., from a buy to a hold).¹⁴ Portfolio construction closely follows Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) and Barber et al. (2006). In the upgrade portfolio, for example, a recommended stock enters the portfolio at the close of trading on the day the recommendation is announced. This explicitly excludes the announcement-day return, on the assumption that many investors likely learn of recommendation changes only with a delay. Each recommended stock remains in the portfolio for the lesser of 2 weeks or until the stock is downgraded or dropped from coverage by the analyst.¹⁵ If more than one analyst changes a recommendation on a particular stock on a given date, the stock will appear multiple times in the portfolio on that date (once for each recommendation change).

We then compute daily calendar-time buy-and-hold portfolio returns for each tape for the period over which the tapes overlap (that is, October 29,

¹⁴ We have experimented with other portfolio classifications (such as including initiations at buy or strong buy in the upgrade portfolio and including initiations at hold, sell, or strong sell in the downgrade portfolio) with similar results.

¹⁵ The choice of a 2-week cutoff point is arbitrary but not selective. We have experimented with a variety of holding periods, from 3 trading days up to 1 calendar year, and the differences across tapes vary significantly across holding periods, further highlighting our main insight.

1993–March 18, 2004). Assuming an equal dollar investment in each stock, the portfolio return on date t is given by $\sum_{i=1}^{n_t} R_{it}x_{it} / \sum_{i=1}^{n_t} x_{it}$, where R_{it} is the date t return on stock i , n_t is the number of stocks in the portfolio, and x_{it} is the compounded daily return of stock i from the close of trading on the day of the recommendation change through day $t - 1$ (for a stock recommended on day $t - 1$, $x_{it} = 1$).

Panel A of Table IV reports the results for the upgrade portfolio (columns (1)–(3)) and for the downgrade portfolio (columns (4)–(6)). The variables *Ret07* and *Ret04* are the average daily calendar-time portfolio returns (in percent) on the 2007 and 2004 tapes, respectively, and *Diffret* is the average daily return difference between the 2007 and 2004 tapes. We also compute abnormal portfolio returns (*DiffXret*) by estimating “four-factor” alphas (Carhart (1997)), which equal the intercept from a regression of *Diffret* less the risk-free rate on the daily excess return of the market over the risk-free rate (*MKT*) and the return difference between small and large-capitalization stocks (*SMB*), high and low book-to-market stocks (*HML*), and high and low price-momentum stocks (*UMD*).

Column (1) indicates that over the full period of overlap (October 29, 1993–March 18, 2004), upgrades on the adjusted 2007 tape earn 16.1 basis points per day, on average, while upgrades on the 2004 tape earn only 14.8 basis points per day. The average daily abnormal return difference (*DiffXret*) between the 2004 and 2007 upgrade samples is 1.3 basis points per day (3.3% annualized). When we split the sample period on March 10, 2000, the day of the NASDAQ peak, we find a substantially larger abnormal return difference of 3.6 basis points per day (9.1% annualized) in the post-“bubble” period (column (2)), and no significant difference in performance prior to March 10, 2000 (column (3)). Thus, the changes to the I/B/E/S 2004 historical record appear to have a disproportionate effect on research that focuses on more recent periods.

Results for downgrades are similar. Downgrades earn –9.5 basis points per day on the adjusted 2007 tape but only –7.8 basis points on the 2004 tape. The average difference, *DiffXret*, is 1.6 basis points per day (4% annualized) for the whole period and 4 basis points per day (10.1% annualized) for the post-bubble period. As with the upgrade tests, each of these results is highly statistically significant. Prior to March 10, 2000, there is again no significant difference in performance.

Overall, these calendar-time portfolio results indicate that back-tests done using the 2004 data instead of the historically more accurate 2007 data would significantly understate the profitability of trading on both upgrades and downgrades, especially in the period following the bubble.

We next compare the market reaction to upgrades and downgrades across tapes. To do so, we compute 3-day raw event returns (equal to the geometrically cumulated return for the day before, day of, and day after the recommendation change) and 3-day excess returns (equal to the raw stock return less the appropriate size-decile return of the CRSP NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ index). Panel B of Table IV reports the results for the full sample of upgrades (in the column entitled “All upgrades”) as well as for individual upgrade categories (e.g., “2 to 1”

Table IV
Effect of Changes on the Abnormal Returns to Upgrades and Downgrades

This table compares the abnormal returns to upgrades and downgrades for the 2004 and 2007 I/B/E/S tapes using two different approaches. Panel A reports average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns for simple calendar-time portfolios based on portfolios of upgrades and downgrades. *Diffret* is average daily return difference between the 2004 portfolio (*Ret04*) and the corresponding 2007 portfolio (*Ret07*). *DiffXret* is the average excess return difference between the same 2004 and 2007 portfolios. Excess returns are equal to the intercept from a regression of *Diffret* (less the riskfree rate) on (i) the excess of the market return over the risk-free rate, (ii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks (SMB), (iii) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks (HML), and (iv) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high price-momentum stocks and one of low price-momentum stocks (UMD). Column (1) reports the average daily returns for the entire sample period over which the 2004 and 2007 tapes overlap (October 29, 1993 to March 18, 2004); columns (2) and (3) report the average daily returns for the post-bubble period (i.e., the period subsequent to March 10, 2000, the date of the NASDAQ market peak) and the pre-bubble period (the period prior to March 10, 2000). Columns (4) to (6) are defined similarly for downgrades. Panels B and C report differences in the 3-day event-time returns between the 2004 and 2007 tapes for upgrades and downgrades, respectively. The column labeled “2 to 1” refers to upgrades from I/B/E/S recommendation code 2 (i.e., “buy”) to I/B/E/S code 1 (i.e., “strong buy”) only; other columns are defined analogously. *ERet04* and *ERet07* are the 3-day raw event returns, calculated as the geometrically cumulated return for the day before, day of, and day after the recommendation, using data from the 2004 and 2007 tapes, respectively. *DiffEret* then equals the average difference between *ERet04* and *ERet07*. Analogously, we compute the 3-day excess event return as the raw stock return less the appropriate size-decile return of the CRSP NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ index (not shown for brevity) and report *DiffEXret*, the average difference between the 3-day excess return samples. *t*-statistics are in parentheses, and 5% statistical significance is indicated with *.

Panel A: Daily Calendar-Time Portfolio Returns (in %): 2004 vs. 2007 Tapes						
	Upgrades			Downgrades		
	Full Period (1)	Post-“bubble” (2)	Pre-“bubble” (3)	Full Period (4)	Post-“bubble” (5)	Pre-“bubble” (6)
<i>Ret07</i>	0.161* (6.76)	0.191* (3.89)	0.142* (6.06)	-0.095* (-3.68)	-0.141* (-2.51)	-0.065* (-2.93)
<i>Ret04</i>	0.148* (6.37)	0.159* (3.36)	0.142* (6.02)	-0.078* (-3.10)	-0.101 (-1.87)	-0.063* (-2.79)
<i>Diffret</i>	0.012* (3.65)	0.032* (3.99)	-0.000 (-0.01)	-0.017* (-4.88)	-0.040* (-4.85)	-0.002 (-1.10)
<i>DiffXret</i>	0.013* (3.90)	0.036* (4.58)	0.000 (0.22)	-0.016* (-4.70)	-0.040* (-4.89)	-0.002 (-1.00)

(continued)

Table IV—Continued

Panel B: Three-Day Upgrade Event Returns (in %): 2004 vs. 2007 Tapes												
All Upgrades	Upgrades to Strong Buy					Upgrades to Buy					To Hold	
	2 to 1	3 to 1	4 to 1	5 to 1		3 to 2	4 to 2	5 to 2			4 to 3	5 to 4
<i>ERet07</i>	3.02* (82.91)	3.04* (44.36)	3.07* (41.12)	3.06* (4.21)	1.84* (4.19)	3.10* (53.46)	4.52* (6.38)	1.27 (1.90)	2.74* (14.92)	2.12* (11.33)	0.89 (1.39)	
<i>ERet04</i>	2.30* (78.47)	2.85* (46.10)	3.00* (42.04)	1.97* (4.56)	1.48* (4.21)	2.37* (50.31)	1.96* (7.22)	0.40 (1.12)	1.05* (14.11)	1.70* (10.87)	0.13 (0.89)	
<i>DiffEret</i>	0.72* (15.37)	0.19* (2.03)	0.07 (0.69)	1.09 (1.29)	0.36 (0.64)	0.73* (9.90)	2.56* (3.37)	0.88 (1.17)	1.69* (9.93)	0.42 (1.74)	0.76 (1.21)	
<i>DiffEXret</i>	0.72* (15.63)	0.20* (2.25)	0.09 (0.90)	1.18 (1.40)	0.52 (0.88)	0.69* (9.28)	2.83* (3.36)	0.58 (0.79)	1.85* (10.69)	0.47 (1.90)	0.66 (1.05)	
Panel C: Three-Day Downgrade Event Returns (in %): 2004 vs. 2007 Tapes												
All Downgrades	Downgrades from Strong Buy					Downgrades from Buy					From Hold	
	1 to 2	1 to 3	1 to 4	1 to 5		2 to 3	2 to 4	2 to 5			3 to 4	4 to 5
<i>ERet07</i>	-4.72* (-103.34)	-4.05* (-53.20)	-5.34* (-53.01)	-6.08* (-6.31)	-4.68* (-6.47)	-4.93* (-70.20)	-6.53* (-10.95)	-3.44* (-3.65)	-4.13* (-13.67)	-3.85* (-16.07)	-0.584 (-0.55)	
<i>ERet04</i>	-3.79* (-99.21)	-3.76* (-51.39)	-5.17* (-54.49)	-5.43* (-9.03)	-3.35* (-5.43)	-4.10* (-68.11)	-3.02* (-10.03)	-1.28* (-2.52)	-1.39* (-11.21)	-2.87* (-14.82)	0.177 (0.97)	
<i>DiffEret</i>	-0.93* (-15.66)	-0.29* (-2.74)	-0.17 (-1.25)	-0.65 (-0.60)	-1.33 (-1.40)	-0.82* (-8.95)	-3.51* (-5.81)	-2.16* (-2.20)	-2.74* (-10.00)	-0.98* (-3.23)	-0.76 (-0.70)	
<i>DiffEXret</i>	-0.89* (-14.74)	-0.26* (-2.50)	-0.24 (-1.48)	-0.99 (-0.85)	-1.19 (-1.16)	-0.75* (-8.09)	-3.18* (-4.90)	-2.17* (-2.14)	-2.78* (-9.46)	-0.96* (-3.01)	-0.887 (-0.76)	

refers to an upgrade from a buy to a strong buy, while “5 to 4” refers to an upgrade from a strong sell to a sell). We use the entire period over which the 2004 and adjusted 2007 tapes overlap (i.e., October 29, 1993 to March 18, 2004). For all upgrades, raw 3-day event returns average 3.02% on the 2007 tape but only 2.30% on the 2004 tape. The average difference in raw event returns between the two tapes, *DiffEret*, is 72 basis points over the 3 days (a 31% increase in percentage terms from the 2004 tape to the 2007 tape), while the average difference in excess event returns between the two tapes, *DiffEXret*, is also 72 basis points per day. In addition, we find large and statistically significant differences between the tapes for several of the individual upgrade categories (e.g., “2 to 1,” “3 to 2,” “4 to 2,” and “4 to 3”).

Panel C of Table IV shows that the differences across the downgrade samples are equally striking. Three-day event returns on the 2004 tape are -3.79% versus -4.72% on the adjusted 2007 tape. The difference in 3-day returns between the two tapes, *DiffEret*, equals -93 basis points, a 24% decrease in percentage terms from the 2004 tape to the 2007 tape; *DiffEXret* too is large at -89 basis points and statistically different from zero. Several of the individual downgrade categories show large differences between the two tapes (e.g., “2 to 4,” “3 to 4,” and “3 to 5”) are each associated with differences in excess of 200 basis points over 3 days).

C. Effects on Returns to Consensus Recommendations

Another commonly used feature of analyst data is the consensus analyst recommendation for a particular firm. Consensus recommendations are frequently employed in quantitative trading strategies, following evidence that sorting based on consensus recommendations (Barber et al. (2001, 2003)) and, particularly, on *changes* in consensus recommendations (Jegadeesh et al. (2004)), is a profitable strategy. How do the changes to the I/B/E/S database affect such a strategy?

We employ a standard portfolio classification technique that each day sorts firms into quintiles based on the lagged change in consensus recommendations on the previous day. For this purpose, recommendations are reverse-scored from 5 (strong buy) to 1 (strong sell). The consensus recommendation for a ticker equals the mean outstanding recommendation at the end of a day (based on a minimum of three recommendations).

Table V reports daily portfolio returns for a trading strategy (“spread”) that buys stocks in the highest change quintile (Q5) and shorts stocks in the lowest change quintile (Q1). We calculate abnormal portfolio returns by computing daily characteristic-adjusted returns constructed as in Daniel et al. (1997; henceforth DGTW).¹⁶ DGTW returns are raw returns minus the returns on a value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, industry-adjusted market-to-book, and 1-year momentum quintiles. The strategy is performed

¹⁶ We obtain similar results when we estimate abnormal returns relative to a four-factor model constructed as in Section II.B.

Table V
Effect of Alterations, Additions, and Deletions on Consensus Trading Strategies

This table reports daily portfolio returns (in %) for a trading strategy (“spread”) based on changes in consensus analyst recommendations. We use all I/B/E/S recommendations that have been outstanding for less than 1 year. The consensus recommendation for a ticker equals the mean outstanding recommendation at the end of a calendar day, based on a minimum of three recommendations. Firms are grouped into quintiles at the beginning of the next day based on the change in consensus. We compute daily portfolio returns by buying stocks in the highest consensus change quintile (Q5) and shorting stocks in the lowest consensus change quintile (Q1). Daily Daniel et al. (1997; “DGTW”) characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw portfolio returns minus the returns on a value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-to-book, and 1-year momentum quintiles. The strategy is performed separately on the 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007 tapes, and differences across tapes are reported. We split the sample into two subperiods, 1993–2000 (“pre-2001”) and 2001 to the end of a tape’s time window (“2001-onward”). In the latter case, the exact sample period for the 2007 comparison tape extends from January 1, 2001 to the end of the tape in question; so, the estimates for the 2007 tape shown in columns (3) and (7) are different for each comparison. *t*-statistics are in parentheses, and 5% statistical significance is indicated with *.

	Pre-2001				2001-onwards			
	Spread (Q5 – Q1) in Raw Portfolio Return (1)	Spread (Q5 – Q1) in DGTW Adjusted Returns (2)	Spread (Q5 – Q1) in DGTW Returns, 2007 Tape (3)	Difference in DGTW Spread: 2007 Minus 200(X) (4)	Spread (Q5 – Q1) in Raw Portfolio Return (5)	Spread (Q5 – Q1) in DGTW Adjusted Returns (6)	Spread (Q5 – Q1) in DGTW Returns, 2007 tape (7)	Difference in DGTW Spread: 2007 Minus 200(X) (8)
2002 tape	0.272* (9.76)	0.266* (9.50)	0.269* (10.64)	0.003 (0.04)	0.477* (8.01)	0.427* (7.22)	0.364* (6.09)	–0.062* (2.10)
2003 tape	0.292* (12.69)	0.289* (11.26)	0.269* (10.64)	–0.020* (–2.26)	0.406* (8.01)	0.383* (7.80)	0.386* (8.61)	0.003 (0.11)
2004 tape	0.294* (12.72)	0.290* (11.21)	0.269* (10.64)	–0.021* (–2.23)	0.428* (10.91)	0.365* (8.83)	0.409* (10.78)	0.044 (1.50)
2005 tape	0.289* (12.42)	0.288* (11.22)	0.269* (10.64)	–0.019* (–2.54)	0.476* (15.34)	0.429* (13.95)	0.426* (13.94)	–0.003 (–0.36)

separately (and identically) on the 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and adjusted 2007 tapes, and differences across tapes are reported. For ease of comparison with the earlier literature on consensus recommendations, much of which focuses on the period through December 2000, we split the sample in half. Results for the pre-2001 period are in columns (1)–(3) and those for the post-2001 period are in columns (5)–(8).¹⁷

While the strategy is profitable in the pre-2001 period, according to each data download, it performs significantly *better* on the 2003, 2004, and 2005 tapes than on the 2002 or 2007 tapes, even though we back-test the strategy over the *exact* same time period. The magnitude of these differences is non-trivial, ranging from 1.9 to 2.1 basis points per day (4.8–5.3% annualized; see

¹⁷ We drop the 2000 tape from this analysis as it ends before the end of 2000 and, so, covers a shorter time period than the other tapes. Similarly, we drop the 2001 tape for lack of sufficient data in the post-2001 time period.

column (4)).¹⁸ This means that the 2003, 2004, and 2005 tapes overstate the profitability of this strategy by 7.1–7.8% relative to the performance found on the 2007 tape.

In columns (5)–(8), each tape is compared individually with the adjusted 2007 tape from January 1, 2001 to the cutoff date of the tape in question. Thus, the spread estimates for the 2007 tape shown in column (7) differ depending on the exact period covered by the tape in question. The results suggest that trading on consensus changes continues to produce significant abnormal returns in the post-2001 time period across the various tapes. Also, while the spread estimates for the 2003, 2004, and 2005 tapes are not significantly different from the 2007 comparison tape, the 2002 spread estimate now is: Trading on consensus changes yielded 6.2 basis points more per day according to the 2002 tape than according to the adjusted 2007 tape (15.6% annualized). This translates into a percentage improvement of 17.3% relative to the performance found on the 2007 tape.

Table V thus reveals a temporary boost to the pre-2001 back-testing performance of the consensus change trading strategy on the 2003, 2004, and 2005 tapes relative to the 2002 tape, a boost that then vanishes on our corrected version of the 2007 tape. By contrast, after 2001, it is the 2002 tape that yields significantly different estimates from the 2007 tape.

D. Effects on Persistence in Analysts' Stock-Picking Ability

Each of the four types of changes to the I/B/E/S database can alter an individual analyst's track record. Several strands of the labor economics, finance, and accounting literatures rely on analyst track records in their empirical tests and hence are potentially affected by the data changes we document: studies of analyst career concerns (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000)), conflicts of interest in the brokerage industry (e.g., Michaely and Womack (1999), Lin and McNichols (1998), Hong and Kubik (2003)), and persistence in individual analysts' stock-picking ability (e.g., Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004), Li (2005)).

In this section, we investigate the impact of the data changes on estimates of stock-picking persistence. We perform a standard test (similar to Mikhail et al. (2004)) on each tape. Analysts are grouped into quintiles at the beginning of each half-year period based on the average 5-day excess return of their recommendation upgrades and downgrades over the prior half-year period.¹⁹ The excess return is the geometrically cumulated DGTW characteristic-adjusted return for the 2 days before through the 2 days after the recommendation change; DGTW returns are constructed as in the previous section. The "persistence

¹⁸ Using a monthly rebalancing rule yields similar results on the differences across tapes. Note that by using daily rebalancing, our estimates of the consensus spread itself are quite large since they ignore the large transactions costs that such a strategy would entail. Our focus, however, is on the *differences* across tapes, and these differences are significant for a variety of different rebalancing rules.

¹⁹ We find similar results using quarterly or annual (rather than semi-annual) windows to measure the past performance of individual analysts.

Table VI
Effect of Changes on Persistence in Individual Analyst Performance

The table reports tests of persistence in individual analysts' stock-picking skills. These tests measure the extent to which good past performers continue to perform well in the future. Tests are performed separately on the 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007 tapes. For each analyst, we compute the average 5-day DGTW-adjusted return of all upgrades and downgrades issued by that analyst over the previous 6 months; in doing so, we assume that we buy on upgrades and sell on downgrades. We then rank analysts into quintiles in January and July of each year, based on their average 5-day DGTW-adjusted returns over the prior 6 months. Next, we compute a "persistence spread" equal to the difference between the average 5-day DGTW-adjusted return of analysts in the highest quintile (Q5) minus the average 5-day DGTW-adjusted return of analysts in the lowest quintile (Q1), in each case computed over the following 6 months. The 5-day return is the geometrically cumulated DGTW-adjusted return for the 2 trading days before through the 2 trading days after the recommendation. Daily DGTW characteristic-adjusted returns are defined as raw returns minus the returns on a value-weighted portfolio of all CRSP firms in the same size, (industry-adjusted) market-to-book, and 1-year momentum quintile. We report persistence spreads for each I/B/E/S tape from 2000 through 2005 (shown in column (1)) and for the 2007 tape (shown in column (2)). Note that each tape is compared over its full available sample period to the 2007 tape; so, the estimates for the 2007 tape shown in column (2) are different for each comparison tape. In column (3), we report differences between each tape and the 2007 tape. *t*-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 5% statistical significance is indicated with *.

Average 5-Day Event Returns (in %) from Persistence Quintiles			
	Persistence Spread (Q5 – Q1) (1)	Persistence Spread (Q5 – Q1) from 2007 Tape (2)	Difference in Persistence Spreads, 2007 – 200X (3)
2000 tape	2.432* (5.62)	2.480* (8.14)	0.047 (0.21)
2001 tape	2.960* (8.13)	2.574* (9.21)	–0.386* (–3.40)
2002 tape	3.079* (7.75)	2.556* (9.68)	–0.523* (–2.22)
2003 tape	2.673* (9.14)	2.490* (9.65)	–0.183 (–1.65)
2004 tape	2.645* (9.95)	2.461* (10.49)	–0.184* (–2.18)
2005 tape	2.561* (11.07)	2.444* (11.76)	–0.118 (–1.86)

spread" equals the difference between the average 5-day DGTW-adjusted return of the highest quintile minus the average 5-day DGTW-adjusted return of the lowest quintile. The persistence spread measures the extent to which good past performers continue to perform well in the future.

Column (1) of Table VI reports average persistence spreads, where each average is computed over the full available sample period for each tape. Each tape is compared individually with the adjusted 2007 tape; therefore, the estimates for the 2007 tape shown in column (2) differ across the 2000–2005 tapes depending

on the exact sample period covered by the tape in question. Pairwise differences in persistence spreads compared with the adjusted 2007 tape are reported in column (3).

Consistent with the findings in Mikhail et al. (2004), column (1) indicates persistence in individual analysts' stock-picking performance in each download, with average 5-day persistence spreads of at least 240 basis points across the 2000–2005 tapes. However, the magnitude of this spread varies markedly across tapes, and the 2007 tape shows smaller persistence spreads than each of the other tapes (except for the 2000 tape). Column (3) shows that three of the six pairwise comparisons with the 2007 tape yield significant differences in persistence spreads. For example, the difference between the 2001 and 2007 tape is 38.6 basis points, an increase of 15.0% relative to the amount of persistence found on the 2007 tape. Similarly, significant differences exist between the 2002 and 2007 tapes (52.3 basis points, a 20.5% increase relative to 2007) and between the 2004 and 2007 tapes (18.4 basis points, a 7.5% increase relative to 2007).

In Table IA.II, available in the Internet Appendix, we show that this result is even more pronounced if we filter on analysts' all-star status (defined as in Section I.C). A common modification to the persistence trading strategy is to buy on recommendations by all-star analysts who are also in quintile 5 and to sell on recommendations by non-all-star analysts ranked in quintile 1. This assumes asymmetry in persistence among all-stars: They are likely to repeat good past performance but not poor past performance. Imposing this screen increases the differences in persistence spreads across the tapes. For example, we find a difference between the 2001 and 2007 tapes of 82.0 basis points over 5 trading days, an increase of 25.3% relative to the amount of persistence found on the 2007 tape. Similarly large differences exist between the 2002 and 2007 tapes (66.3 basis points, a 21.1% increase relative to 2007) and between the 2003 and 2007 tapes (36.6 basis points, a 12.1% increase relative to 2007).

Taken together, our findings suggest that while we continue to find evidence of persistence in analyst performance using the historically more accurate 2007 data, the magnitude of such persistence is substantially lower than if one were to use prior contaminated versions of I/B/E/S.

III. Conclusions

We document widespread ex post changes to the historical contents of the I/B/E/S analyst stock recommendations database. Across a sequence of seven nearly annual downloads of the entire recommendations database, obtained between 2000 and 2007, we find that between 1.6% and 21.7% of matched observations are different from one download to the next. When we use a cleaned-up version of the 2007 tape as a point of comparison, we find that between 10% and 30% of all observations on the earlier tapes are now recorded differently on the 2007 tape.

These changes appear nonrandom and have a significant impact on several features of the data that are routinely used by academics and practitioners.

They cluster according to three popular conditioning variables: analyst reputation, broker status, and boldness. The changes also have systematically optimistic and pessimistic patterns that vary across time and that affect the classification of trading signals. We demonstrate the potential effects these changes have on academic research by examining three central tests from the empirical analyst literature: the profitability of trading signals, the profitability of changes in consensus recommendations, and the persistence in individual analyst performance. In each case, despite examining identical sample periods, we find economically and statistically significant differences in estimated effects across our various downloads.

While most finance empiricists are accustomed to dealing with data issues like selection bias or measurement error, they seldom question the very constancy and veracity of historical data. Given the conflicting incentives of data providers, and the technological demands of handling vast (and increasing) amounts of historical data, however, this tendency may be problematic. Our results demonstrate that the integrity of historical data is an important issue for empiricists to consider.

Appendix: How History was Rewritten

A. Deletions and Additions

Most additions and deletions are apparently symptoms of a systematic process error that has affected the database throughout its entire existence until Thomson fixed the process, in response to our enquiries, in the spring of 2007.

The error concerns the broker recommendation translation table that maps each broker's recommendation scale onto the familiar five-point I/B/E/S scale. Recommendations enter the database by broker, ticker, and recommendation only (for example, "ABC, MSFT, market perform"). This information is then matched by broker to a broker translation table, in which ABC's recommendation of "market perform" is translated as I/B/E/S recommendation level 3. Thomson contends that its data entry clerks occasionally overwrote existing entries in the translation table when faced with variations or changes in wording of the broker's recommendation. For example, if ABC changes its "market perform" recommendations to "mkt. performer", a clerk may overwrite broker ABC's "market perform" entry when adding the "mkt. performer" entry to the table. As a result, the next time the historical recommendations database is created for export to clients, the translation table will fail to translate any of ABC's historic "market perform" recommendations. From a client's point of view, these records will appear to have been deleted. Additions occur when another data entry clerk, by chance or because he has noticed the missing recommendations, at some later point adds the "market perform" entry back into the broker translation table.

Thus, an entire level of a broker's historic recommendations (e.g., every "sell") can go missing for some time and then reappear. In this sense, additions are reversals of past deletions. To illustrate, in September 2001, I/B/E/S lost all

1,716 historic “market perform” recommendations of a particular broker. They were restored in a November 2002 cleanup when Thomson noticed that thousands of recommendations were missing. Subscribers were apparently not notified. However, the November 2002 cleanup did not address the cause of the deletions, which only came to light in the spring of 2007, as a result of our investigation. Thus, the database continued to experience deletions and additions until recently.

Besides problems with the broker translation table, most remaining additions and deletions between 2003 and 2005 were caused by the erroneous inclusion of recommendations issued by eight quantitative research groups.²⁰ According to Thomson, these recommendations were not supposed to be viewable by its clients, yet became part of the database some time between 2003 and 2004. They were subsequently permanently removed at some point between 2004 and 2005.²¹

B. Anonymizations

Thomson’s database stores recommendations by broker and not by analyst. To add the analyst’s identity, Thomson combines data from the recommendations database with data from the coverage table that records which analyst covers which tickers at which broker between which dates.

During 2003, Thomson undertook a major review of the coverage table in an effort to reconcile the I/B/E/S and First Call databases and to remove invalid coverage assignments. In the process, the start and end dates of various analyst/broker/ticker triads were changed. This apparently resulted in some historic recommendations no longer being associated with an analyst and hence being “anonymized.” Separately, Thomson attempted to consolidate instances of multiple analyst codes for a given analyst but in the process removed the entire coverage history for some analysts.

In response to an earlier version of this paper, in December 2006, Thomson changed the file generation process so that anonymizations should not occur in the future.

C. Alterations

Brokerage firms often tweak their rating scales. To illustrate, in the wake of the Global Settlement, many firms moved from a five- or four-point scale to a

²⁰ Note that the quantitative research groups produce algorithmic recommendations constrained to be symmetrically distributed. Thus, tests that include these data points will face lower average recommendation levels.

²¹ In addition, some records were permanently deleted between 2000 and 2007 at the request of brokerage firms that no longer wished their data to be available through I/B/E/S. In such instances, Thomson issues a notification to its clients. Since the 2007 tape is purged of prior errors, most of the deletions on the 2007 tape relative to earlier tape comparisons represent broker removals. An exception is 2004, a year in which there were erroneous *additions* that are also deleted on the 2007 tape.

simpler three-point scale (say, buy/hold/sell). When brokers adopt new rating scales, they sometimes request that Thomson restate, *retroactively*, their entire history of recommendations in an effort to make past and future recommendations appear on the same scale. According to Thomson, the vast majority of alterations result from such requests. The remainder are the result of errors made by Thomson in effecting these requests.²² From a research point of view, retrospective ratings changes are problematic, as the recommendation recorded in the database no longer matches the recommendation market participants had access to at the time.

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²² Thomson estimates that approximately 20% of the alterations that occurred between 2002 and 2004 are due to errors it made in restating broker recommendations retroactively.

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