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Is Debt Relief Efficient?

SERKAN ARSLANALP and PETER BLAIR HENRY*

ABSTRACT

When developing countries announce debt relief agreements under the Brady Plan, their stock markets appreciate by an average of 60% in real dollar terms—a \$42 billion increase in shareholder value. There is no significant stock market increase for a control group of countries that do not sign Brady agreements. The stock market appreciations successfully forecast higher future resource transfers, investment, and growth. Since the market capitalization of U.S. commercial banks with developing country loan exposure also rises—by \$13 billion—the results suggest that both borrower and lenders can benefit from debt relief when the borrower suffers from debt overhang.

BONO AND JESSE HELMS WANT DEBT RELIEF for the developing countries. The Pope and 17 million people are behind them. At a June 1999 meeting of G8 leaders in Cologne, Germany, the lead singer of the rock band U2 presented Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder with 17 million signatures in support of the Debt Relief Initiative (Jubilee (2000)). In November 1998, Pope John Paul II issued a Papal Bull calling on the wealthy nations to relieve the debts of developing nations in order to “remove the shadow of death” (The Vatican (1998)).

Opponents of debt relief occupy less hallowed ground but are no less zealous about their cause, citing at least two reasons why the debt relief campaign is misguided. First, debt relief alone cannot solve the problem of developing country debt. Even if all debt were forgiven, it will accumulate again if income does not grow faster than expenditure (O'Neill (2002)). Second, debt relief can create perverse incentives for debtor countries. By relaxing budget constraints, debt relief may permit governments to prolong wasteful economic policies (Easterly (2001)).

Do the benefits of debt relief outweigh the costs? Or is debt relief a welfare-reducing market intervention? The stock market provides a natural place to search for answers. Changes in stock prices reflect both revised expectations

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about future corporate profits and the discount rate at which those profits are capitalized. Consequently, the stock market response to the announcement of a debt relief program collapses the entire expected future stream of debt relief costs and benefits into a single summary statistic: the expected net benefit (current and future) of the program.

The expected effect of debt relief on the stock market depends on the model of sovereign lending to which one subscribes. Models of private lending to sovereign countries that emphasize costs suggest three channels through which debt relief may adversely affect the recipient country's stock market.¹ First, if debt relief allows a government to persist in pursuing wasteful policies, economic growth and corporate profits may be reduced, impacting stock prices adversely. Second, countries that do not honor their debts may incur costs in the form of trade sanctions, which may also hurt growth and profits (Bulow and Rogoff (1989a)). If debt relief negotiations involve costly bargaining, countries could find themselves punished by lenders. In practice, countries that renegotiate their debts do experience a subsequent loss of access to trade (Rose and Spiegel (2002)). Third, debt relief involves the restructuring of private debt, which may damage the debtor's reputation for repayment and raise its future cost of borrowing in international capital markets (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)).²

On the other hand, borrower and lenders can benefit from debt relief when the borrower suffers from debt overhang. If each creditor would agree to forgive some of its claims, then the debtor would be better able to service the debt owed to each creditor. Consequently, the expected value of all creditors' claims would rise (Krugman (1988), Sachs (1989)). Forgiveness will not happen without coordination, however, because any individual creditor would prefer to have a free ride, maintaining the full value of its claims while others write off some debt.

By forcing all creditors to accept some losses, debt relief can solve the collective action problem and pave the way for profitable new lending (Cline (1995)). By relaxing the intertemporal budget constraint, the new capital inflow may reduce the discount rate in the debtor country. To the extent that the country suffers from a debt overhang caused by the collective action problem, debt relief increases the incentive to undertake efficient investments. In turn, these investments may raise expected future growth rates and cash flows (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1989), Krugman (1989), Myers (1977), Sachs (1989)).

On March 10, 1989, the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, Nicholas F. Brady, called for developing country debt relief. Between 1989 and 1995, 16 developing countries reached debt relief agreements with their private creditors under the Brady Plan. Figure 1 shows what happened. In anticipation of the official announcement of its Brady deal, the average country's stock market appreciated by 60% over the 12-month preannouncement period. Stated in

¹ For an examination of the costs and benefits of official lending to sovereign states, see Arslanalp and Henry (2005).

² Because it is the result of an agreement between borrower and lender, debt relief does not constitute an outright default. Nonetheless, debt relief violates the terms of the original loan contract and therefore constitutes a restructuring default (Vir Bhatia (2002)).




Figure 1. Debtor-country stock prices rise in anticipation of debt relief. The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage change. Zero is the month in which the debt relief plan was announced. The solid line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 10 Brady countries with stock market data available on a constant and 9 country-specific dummies. The dashed line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies.

dollar terms, the market capitalization of debtor country stock markets rose by a total of \$42 billion.

Nor were the wealth gains from debt relief simply a wealth transfer to the debtor nations from the western commercial banks. Figure 2 shows that the stock prices of the 11 major U.S. commercial banks with large LDC loan exposure increased by an average of 35%—a \$13.3 billion increase in market capitalization. Adding the countries' wealth increase to that of the banks gives a rough sense of the Brady Plan's net benefit.

To be sure, the stock market demonstrates efficiency gains only in a narrow *ex post* sense. Debt relief may also induce *ex ante* contracting inefficiencies. For example, *ex ante* knowledge that debts may be restructured may reduce efficiency by making borrowers less careful. On the other hand, knowledge that debts may be restructured could raise efficiency by making lenders more careful (Darity and Horn (1988), Fischer (1987), Bolton and Skeel (2003)).³ Our data do not admit analysis of these *ex ante* issues. Nevertheless, to the extent that debt restructurings induce *ex ante* efficiency losses, the existence of some

³ For an alternative view, see Shleifer (2003).




Figure 2. Stock prices of banks with LDC loan exposure rise in anticipation of debt relief. The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage change. Zero is the month (March 1989) in which the Brady Plan was announced. The solid line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from 11 banks with high LDC loan exposure on a constant and 10 bank-specific dummies. The dashed line is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from nine control group banks with no LDC loan exposure on a constant and eight bank-specific dummies.

ex post efficiency gains is a necessary condition for debt relief to be welfare improving.

In addition to the narrowness of our welfare metric, there are many other reasons to be concerned about using the stock market to evaluate debt relief. For example, one should not look at debtor-country stock market responses in isolation. If the Brady Plan coincides with a positive global economic shock that is unrelated to debt relief, then debtor-country stock markets may rise in concert with stock markets in countries that do not sign debt relief agreements.

In order to distinguish the effect of debt relief from that of a common shock, compare the stock market response of the Brady countries with the market response of a similar group of countries that did not sign Brady deals. Figure 1 shows that a control group of nonsigning developing countries does not experience a significant increase in stock prices. Similarly, Figure 2 shows that the price increase for the U.S. commercial banks is not driven by a common shock; there is no significant price increase for a control group of U.S. commercial banks that did not have significant developing country exposure.

Perhaps a greater concern is that anticipated economic reforms drive the price increase shown in Figure 1. Countries receive Brady deals in return for committing to IMF- and World-Bank-supported reforms that are designed to increase openness and raise productivity. So, it is possible that stock prices go

up because debt relief signals future reforms. The paper attempts to distinguish the effects of debt relief from those of reforms by making use of a key historical fact. On October 8, 1985, the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, James A. Baker III, announced a plan for dealing with the Developing Country Debt Crisis. The Baker Plan called on the debtor countries to undertake extensive economic reforms—stabilization, trade liberalization, privatization, and greater openness to foreign direct investment—but deliberately excluded any plans for debt relief. In contrast, the Brady Plan explicitly called for debt relief in addition to the continuation of the reforms begun under the Baker Plan 4 years earlier.

The difference between the focus of the two plans implies that the “news” in the Baker announcement was the official U.S. push for economic reforms, while the “news” in the Brady announcement was the official U.S. push for debt relief. In other words, because economic reforms were enacted under the Baker Plan, their effects should already have been incorporated into stock prices when the Brady Plan was announced. If markets are efficient, then the market reaction to the Brady Plan should principally reflect the anticipated effect of debt relief.

The Baker Plan notwithstanding, it is still important to confirm that the economic reforms enacted around the time of the Brady Plan do not drive the stock price increase shown in Figure 1. We do just that, and address other concerns about the robustness of our results as well. In addition to inferring that the Brady agreement did not signal any new information about economic reforms, we also confront the issue directly. We do so by documenting the dates on which major reforms occurred and testing empirically whether the reforms had any effect on stock prices. The stock market increase associated with debt relief remains economically large and statistically significant in all regression specifications that include the economic reform variables.

After grappling with concerns about robustness, we turn to more primitive issues of interpretation: Why do stock prices rise? Is this a spurious result? Or does the stock market rationally forecast future changes in the fundamentals? If market values rise because debt relief paves the way for profitable new lending, then the stock market responses should have some predictive power for future changes in net resource transfers (NRTs). Similarly, if the Brady Plan alleviated debt overhang, we should see more investment and growth. The descriptive evidence we provide is not definitive, but the stock market responses do help to predict changes in the NRT, investment, and GDP growth for up to 5 years following the agreements.

I. The Debt Crisis and the Brady Plan

The Mexican default on August 12, 1982, triggered the beginning of the Developing Country Debt Crisis. The next 5 years were marked by frequent debt restructurings and new-money packages that tried but failed to resolve the crisis (James (1996), chapter 12). A critical point was reached in February 1987, when Brazil declared a debt moratorium and suspended all interest payments to its creditors. In response to the Brazilian moratorium, Citibank announced a

Table I
A Typical Country Restructures Its External Debt Several Times
Between the 1982 Mexican Default and Its Own Brady Deal

The first column lists all the countries that signed the Brady deals. The second column lists the number of debt restructurings that took place in the country after Mexico's default in August 1982 and before the country's Brady agreement was announced. The source for the information on country restructuring dates is the World Bank's *Global Development Finance* (1997). The last column lists the date on which each country's Brady Deal was announced.

	Number of Restructurings from 1982 to Brady	First Restructuring Date after 1982	Last Restructuring Date before the Brady Deal	Brady Deal Announcement Date
Argentina	2	August 1985	August 1987	April 1992
Bolivia	1	July 1988	July 1988	March 1993
Brazil	4	February 1983	November 1988	August 1992
Bulgaria	0	NA	NA	November 1993
Costa Rica	2	September 1983	May 1985	November 1989
Dominican Republic	2	December 1983	February 1986	May 1993
Ecuador	3	October 1983	November 1987	May 1994
Jordan	1	September 1989	September 1989	June 1993
Mexico	5	August 1983	August 1987	September 1989
Nigeria	2	November 1987	March 1989	March 1991
Panama	1	October 1985	October 1985	May 1995
Peru	1	July 1983	July 1983	October 1995
Philippines	2	January 1986	December 1987	August 1989
Poland	6	April 1982	July 1988	March 1994
Uruguay	3	July 1983	March 1988	November 1990
Venezuela	2	February 1986	September 1988	June 1990

\$2.5 billion increase in its loan-loss reserves on May 20. Shortly after Citibank's decision, a number of other banks made similar announcements (Boehmer and Megginson (1990)).

Table I provides a brief summary of the debt restructuring history of the 16 developing countries that eventually received a Brady Plan. Column 2 shows that a large number of restructurings took place in each country between 1982 and the time of its Brady deal. Column 3 indicates that a number of countries began to restructure their debt prior to Citicorp's increase in loan-loss reserves, suggesting that developing country loans may, in fact, have become nonperforming prior to May 1987. Column 4 gives the date of the last debt restructuring that took place before the announcement of a country's Brady deal; only four countries did not restructure their debt after May 1987.

Finally, column 5 of Table I lists the official announcement date of each country's Brady Plan. The principal source of announcement dates is *International Debt Reexamined* (Cline (1995), Table 5.3, p. 234). However, the book does not provide announcement dates for Bolivia, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, and the Philippines. For these five countries we retrieved announcement dates using the LexisNexis Academic Universe (<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>).

We verified the accuracy of the search by matching the dates obtained from Lexis–Nexis with those in the Quarterly Economic Reports of the *Economist Intelligence Unit* (EIU).

A. What Was Restructured?

The goal of the Brady Plan was to restructure the commercial banks' loans in such a way that interest payments would be reduced, principal forgiven, and maturities lengthened. The plan restructured both the public and publicly guaranteed debt claims of the commercial banks. The public debt consisted of commercial banks' loans to the central government. The publicly guaranteed debt consisted of loans that were guaranteed by the central government: trade credit; project finance; and bank loans to regional governments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Roughly 50% of the debt was held by the U.S. commercial banks (Cline (1995), pp. 62 and 76). Under the Brady Plan, the commercial banks were presented with four restructuring options:

1. *Discount Bonds*. Issue bonds with the total face value of the debt reduced by 30–35% and an interest rate of LIBOR plus 13/16; a “bullet” single payment maturity of 30 years with U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bond collateral on principal and a rolling guarantee of 12–18 months of interest.
2. *Par Bonds*. Issue bonds worth the full face value of the debt with an interest rate of 6% and similar maturity and collateralization as the discount bonds.
3. *New Money*. Retain the full value of the debt, but issue new loans in the amount of 25% of current exposure over the next 3 years, with at least half of the new money coming within the 1st year.
4. *Cash Buybacks*. Repurchase the debt at a specific price.

In countries that were relatively less indebted, banks favored the new money option, whereas in heavily indebted countries there was very little new money. Cash buybacks were limited to small, low-income countries with little bank debt, such as Costa Rica. The discount bond was designed for banks concerned about limiting the risk of interest rate fluctuations. The par bond was intended for banks located in countries where regulatory and tax considerations made maintaining full face value preferable (Cline (1995)).

In total, approximately \$202.8 billion worth of debt was restructured, resulting in \$64.7 billion of debt relief. The average spread on the loans fell from 17/16 over LIBOR before the Brady Plan to 13/16 over LIBOR on the discount bonds after the restructuring.⁴ Similarly, debt prices rose. In the year prior to restructuring, the average country's debt was trading at 32 cents on the dollar in the secondary market. In the month of the Brady Deal, the average price rose to 42 cents on the dollar. Finally, the average maturity of the debt increased from 15 to 30 years.

⁴ For an early analysis of developing country loan spreads, see Edwards (1984).

II. Data and Descriptive Findings

The principal source of stock market data is the IFC's Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB).⁵ Stock price indices for individual countries are the dividend-inclusive, U.S. dollar-denominated, and local currency-denominated IFC Global Indices. For most countries, EMDB's coverage begins in December 1975, but for others coverage begins in December 1984. Each country's U.S. dollar-denominated stock price index is deflated by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), which comes from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS). The local currency-denominated index is deflated by the local CPI for each country, which is also obtained from the IFS. Returns and inflation are calculated as the first difference of the natural logarithm of the real stock price and CPI, respectively. All the data are monthly. We were able to obtain stock market data for 10 of the Brady countries: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Jordan, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, and Venezuela.

A. Selection of the Control Group

The control group consists of all developing countries that (1) did not receive a Brady Plan and (2) have stock market data in the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Emerging Market Data Base. There are 16 such countries: Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

The purpose of the control group is to determine whether the stock price increase in the debtor countries was driven by a global economic shock unrelated to debt relief. Therefore, it is crucial that the control group not consist of countries in such an abject state of development that their stock markets would not respond to a positive external shock, no matter how favorable. We address this concern by examining the characteristics of the Brady and control groups in some detail.

The Brady countries and the control group display similar geographical dispersion. Both groups contain countries from Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. One significant difference is that Latin American countries comprise the largest fraction of the Brady countries, while the control group primarily consists of countries in Asia. History suggests that the relatively heavier weighting of Asian countries in the control group will make that group the stronger economic performer. We confirm this suspicion by comparing the Brady countries and the control group using two standard measures of economic performance, growth and inflation.

The control group outperforms the Brady countries on both measures. Between 1980 and 1999 the median growth rate of per capita GDP for the control group was 3%. The Brady group grew by only 1% per year during the same time period. GDP growth was also less volatile in the control group.

⁵ For Ecuador, the source of stock market data is the Global Financial Data Base.

The standard error of GDP growth for the control group was 1%, as compared to 2% for the Brady group. Finally, the control group has a lower and less volatile rate of inflation: a median of 11% and a standard deviation of 3%. The corresponding inflation statistics for the Brady countries are 27% and 18%.

To summarize, the median country in the control group has faster and less volatile growth, together with lower and less volatile inflation, than its Brady group counterpart. To the extent that superior long-run economic performance is positively correlated with better-managed economies, we would expect stock markets in the median control-group country to be more responsive to any auspicious common shock.

B. Descriptive Findings

For each Brady country, we calculate the average monthly stock return over the entire sample. The average monthly return is a proxy for the expected monthly return. Subtracting a country's expected return from its actual return gives the abnormal return.⁶ Let month [0] be the month in which a Brady debt relief announcement takes place for a given country. Similarly, let $[-12]$ denote the 12th month before the debt relief announcement, so that $[-12, 0]$ denotes the 1-year window preceding the announcement. The cumulative abnormal return for a country is defined as the sum of its abnormal returns from month -12 to month 0.

Figure 1 plots the average cumulative abnormal return across all 10 Brady countries and the control group in event time.⁷ The solid line shows that the average Brady country experiences cumulative abnormal returns of 60% in real dollar terms. In other words, the real dollar value of the stock market increases by 60% more than it does in a typical year. Now look at the graph for the control group. If a common shock caused stock prices to go up in the Brady countries, then we should also see an increase in the stock prices of the control group. This is not the case. The dashed line shows that the average cumulative abnormal return for the control group is close to 0. The preliminary conclusion is that the stock price increase in the debtor countries is not due exclusively to a common shock that has favorable effects on all emerging stock markets.

By constructing a control group of relatively strong economic performers, we are able to distinguish the effect of the Brady Plan from that of a common shock. But Figure 1 raises an important question about selection bias that has not yet been addressed. Do stock prices rise because countries that sign Brady Deals

⁶ Alternative measures of abnormal returns are considered in Section III.

⁷ For a given Brady country, the control group abnormal returns are calculated as follows. Fix the announcement date [0] for the country in question. Next, for each of the 16 countries in the control group, calculate the abnormal returns for $[-12, 0]$. This calculation gives 16 sets of abnormal returns for the fixed Brady-country date. Next, calculate the average of these 16 sets of abnormal returns and you have the single series of abnormal returns for the control group associated with the first country. Now repeat the procedure for the other nine Brady countries. Doing so yields 10 series of average abnormal returns for the months $[-12, 0]$. Finally, taking the average across all 10 series gives the average abnormal return for the entire control group.

are the ones most likely to benefit from debt relief? Put another way, would stock prices have gone up in the Brady countries had they not received debt relief? In order to address the counterfactual, we replicated the dashed line in Figure 1 using two alternative control groups: (1) a group of highly indebted countries that did not receive debt relief and (2) the Brady countries that were still waiting to receive their Brady deals. The control-group graphs constructed in this manner are as flat as the graph for the original control group.⁸

Since there are only 10 countries in the Brady stock market group, another concern is that one country may dominate the results. To explore this possibility, we conduct median tests in the following way. For each of the 10 countries we compute the median annual stock return. The stock return in the 12-month period preceding the Brady announcement exceeds the median, annual return for every country except Peru. We also conducted median tests in local currency, and the results were the same. Peru is the only country whose stock return during the 12-month announcement window was less than its median 12-month return.

Finally, the results may be sensitive to whether real returns are measured in dollars or in the local currency. To address the issue, we replicated Figure 1 using real local currency returns instead of real dollar returns. The resulting graph was virtually identical to Figure 1. Since the choice of currency makes little difference, the formal empirical analysis in Section IV focuses on the dollar-denominated returns.

C. Why Use a 12-Month Event Window?

Using a 12-month window provides a reasonable characterization of the data because the announcement of a debt relief agreement is less a discrete occurrence than a series of events during which the public gradually learns the details of the government's negotiations to reduce its external debt burden. Examples from three representative countries illustrate the point.

Argentina had a 9-month window of negotiations with its external creditors, extending from July of 1991 to the official announcement of an agreement in April 1992. In July 1991, the EIU reported, "The International Monetary Fund approves a \$1 billion stand-by loan." On September 20, 1991, the *Financial Times* reported, "Domingo Cavallo comes to Washington to jump-start negotiations on the country's \$61bn debt." On March 31, 1992 the *Financial Times* reported, "Argentina secures a \$3.15bn extended facility fund loan from the IMF. Approval of the loan is important for securing a restructuring with the creditor banks."

Nigeria had a 10-month window of negotiations with its external creditors, extending from May 1990 to its official announcement in March 1991. The window of public negotiations began with a *Financial Times* story on October 3, 1990, "The resolution of the five-month deadlock over rescheduling terms for Nigeria's \$5.5bn commercial bank debt appears likely." The reference to a 5-month deadlock suggests that the sequence of public events may actually

⁸ These graphs are not shown but are available on request.

have begun as early as May 1990. Between October 1990 and March 1991, the *Financial Times* ran at least two more stories about Nigeria's negotiations with its creditors.

Finally, Venezuela had an 11-month window of negotiations that began with the *Washington Post's* declaration on July 25, 1989: "The Mexican deal will set a pattern for dealing with the debt problems of other nations. Brady puts the Philippines, Venezuela and Costa Rica at the head of the list." On March 21, 1990, the *New York Times* reported, "Venezuela and its creditor banks reach an agreement on the basic terms of a deal."

The average length of the window in these three countries is 10 months. This estimate is based on the earliest reported news headlines that we could find through LexisNexis. Even if these are, in fact, the earliest public releases of information, the possibility remains that the news was leaked to the markets prior to the news dates that we collected. Admittedly, constructing the event window is at least as much art as it is science, but all things considered, a 12-month window does no obvious harm to the data. Furthermore, Section IV estimates results using 12-month, 9-month, 6-month, and 3-month windows—the effect of debt relief on the stock market is positive and significant in all specifications.

Of course, a long event window raises the specter of reverse causality. Instead of debt relief generating a stock market boom, maybe rising stock markets and improved economic prospects cause countries to write-down their debts. In thinking about this issue, it is important to remember that countries cannot simply decide that they want debt relief and make it so. Debt relief requires a mutual agreement between parties: The debtor requests a write-down and the creditor agrees to forgive some of the debt. Reaching such agreements can take a long time, because both the debtor and creditor want to exercise their bargaining power (Froot et al. (1989)). Consequently, negotiations might reach a deadlock, which could take many months to resolve, as illustrated by the case of Nigeria in October 1990. Given the length of time and the number of parties involved in sovereign debt restructurings, it is difficult to believe that a debtor country would be able to push through a debt relief agreement as a swift policy response to a rising stock market and improving economic prospects.

Four central facts emerge from this section: (1) stock markets in debtor countries rise by 60% in real dollar terms in response to news of debt relief; (2) the response is uniformly positive across debtor countries; (3) the effect is not an artifact of the currency in which the revaluation is measured; and (4) the control group never experiences a revaluation of greater than 10 percentage points. Having eliminated outliers, currency concerns, and common shocks as explanations for our result, there is another, much trickier issue to address before proceeding to formal statistical estimation.

III. Are the Revaluations Driven by Debt Relief or Reforms?

Countries receive debt relief in return for committing to economic reforms (Cline (1995)). These reforms take four principal forms—inflation stabilization, privatization, trade liberalization, and capital account liberalization—and

there is evidence that the stock market responds favorably to each one of them (Megginson and Netter (2001), Perotti and Van Oijen (2001), Henry (2000a, 2002, 2003)). Therefore, a central issue is whether debt relief or economic reforms drive the debtor-country stock price increases. To address the issue, we conducted a search to pinpoint the dates when the reforms occur. The results are outlined in Table II.

The stabilization dates come from the International Monetary Fund's Annual Reports and Henry (2002). We use the EIU's *Quarterly Economic Reports* to identify trade liberalization dates. We check the EIU dates against the trade liberalization dates in the World Bank publication, *Trends in Developing Economies* (1994) and those in Sachs and Warner (1995). The privatization dates come from the *World Bank Privatization Transaction Database*, which contains the names and dollar amounts of all privatizations occurring between 1988 and 1999. We use the privatization database to identify the first year in which there were recorded sales of SOEs. Once we know the year of the first sale, we search the EIU's *Quarterly Economic Reports* for the month in which the start of the privatization program was announced. We also check the EIU to make sure that there were no privatizations preceding the starting date of the database. Finally, the capital account liberalization dates come from Henry (2003).

A close examination of Table II illustrates the point of the exercise. All of the debtor countries began implementing major economic reforms before the Brady deal and continued to do so after the deal was announced. For example, column 3 of Table II shows that an official agreement with the IMF immediately precedes or follows on the heels of every Brady deal. Since IMF programs follow all of the Brady agreements, Brady agreements may drive up stock prices because they signal future IMF agreements. Just as debt relief agreements may signal future IMF agreements, IMF agreements may in turn signal countries' commitment to future economic reforms (Bruno and Easterly (1996) and Collins (1990)). If debt relief agreements are a signal of future productivity-enhancing reforms, then Figure 1 may erroneously suggest that debt relief drives up valuations when, in fact, the anticipation of future economic reforms is instead responsible.

A. The Baker Plan versus the Brady Plan

We use the Baker Plan and the Brady Plan to help distinguish the response of the stock market to reforms from the response of the stock market to debt relief. Our identification strategy hangs on a key historical fact. The Baker Plan called on countries to undertake extensive reforms but deliberately excluded any plans for debt relief.⁹ In contrast, the Brady Plan called for the continuation of reforms begun under the Baker Plan but also made an explicit call for debt relief.

⁹ There were 17 countries included in the Baker Plan: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. The 16 countries included in the Brady Plan are listed in Table I.

Table II
Brady Deals Are Preceded by a Number of Economic Reforms

This table lists the announcement dates of major economic events for the Brady countries. The first column identifies these countries. The second column lists the month and year of each country's Brady Plan. These dates are obtained from Cline (1995), Lexis-Nexis, and various issues of the *Economist Intelligence Unit*. The third column lists IMF plans that are announced shortly preceding or following Brady Plans. These dates are obtained from Henry (2002) and various issues of the IMF Annual Reports. A Standby agreement with the IMF is noted as SB and an Extended Fund Facility agreement is noted as EFF. The next three columns list the dates of the beginnings of major economic reforms. The trade liberalization dates are obtained from Sachs and Warner (1995) and Trends in Developing Economies (1994). The privatization dates are obtained from the Privatization Data Base maintained by the World Bank. The capital account liberalization dates are obtained from Henry (2003).

Country	Brady Plan	Stabilization (IMF Program)	Trade Liberalization	Privatization	Capital Account Liberalization
Argentina	April 1992	March 1992 (EFF)	April 1991	February 1988	November 1989
Bolivia	March 1993		1985	1992	NA
Brazil	August 1992	January 1992 (SB)	April 1990	July 1990	March 1988
Bulgaria	November 1993	NA	NA	1991	NA
Costa Rica	November 1989	NA	1986	1988	NA
Dominican Republic	May 1993	NA	Closed	1999	NA
Ecuador	May 1994	May 1994	January 1991	February 1993	January 1993
Jordan	June 1993	May 1994 (EFF)	1965	January 1995	January 1978
Mexico	September 1989	May 1989 (EFF)	July 1986	November 1988	May 1989
Nigeria	March 1991	January 1991 (SB)	Closed	July 1988	Closed
Panama	May 1995		NA	1990	NA
Peru	October 1995	March 1993 (EFF)	March 1991	March 1991	(Open before 1995)
Philippines	August 1989	May 1989 (EFF)	November 1988	June 1988	May 1986
Poland	March 1994	August 1994 (SB)	1990	1990*	1990
Uruguay	November 1990		1990	1990	NA
Venezuela	June 1990	June 1989 (EFF)	May 1989**	April 1991	January 1990

* Poland switched to a market economy in 1990, simultaneously setting up a stock market and opening up to foreign investment.

**Venezuela reversed its trade liberalization reforms in 1993.

The difference in the focus of the two plans implies that the “news” in Baker was the official U.S. push for economic reforms while the “news” in Brady was the official U.S. push for debt relief. In other words, because economic reforms were enacted under the Baker Plan, their effects should already have been incorporated into stock prices when the Brady Plan was announced 4 years later. If markets are efficient, then the stock price reaction to the Brady Plan should principally reflect the anticipated effect of debt relief.

On October 8, 1985, the Secretary of the United States Treasury, James A. Baker III, unveiled his plan for dealing with the third-world debt crisis at the Annual International Monetary Fund World Bank Meeting in Seoul, Korea. Secretary Baker begins by stressing the importance of macroeconomic stabilization:

If the debt problem is going to be solved there must be a “Program for Sustained Growth”, incorporating . . . First and foremost, the adoption by principal debtor countries of comprehensive macroeconomic and structural policies, supported by the international financial institutions, to promote growth and balance of payments adjustment, and to reduce inflation (Baker (1985a), p. 308).

After spelling out the need for stabilization, Baker calls for structural reforms:

For those countries which have implemented reforms to address the imbalances in their economies, a more comprehensive set of policies can now be put in place . . . We believe that such institutional and structural policies should include: increased reliance on the private sector, and less reliance on government; . . . tax reform, labor market reform and development of financial markets; . . . market opening measures to encourage foreign direct investment and capital inflows, as well as to liberalize trade (Baker (1985a), p. 310).

The enumeration of desired reforms in Secretary Baker’s speech displays an attention to detail that underscores the importance of what he does not mention: debt relief. Baker uses or alludes to the word “reform” more than 25 times during the course of his speech. But the phrases “debt relief” and “debt reduction” do not appear.

While testifying before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs 2 weeks later, Secretary Baker erased any doubt that the absence of the phrase “debt relief” from his speech was an error of omission. Witness the exchange between Secretary Baker and Representative Bill McCollum of Florida.

McCollum: “Do you anticipate that there might have to be some forgiveness or moratorium on interest payments to some of these countries in the process by the commercial lending institutions in this country?”

Baker: “No, sir; I don’t contemplate that and I think that would be the wrong road for us to start down . . . I don’t think there should be any

moratorium; I don't think there should be any capitalization of interest proposals or anything like that . . ." (Baker (1985b), p. 26).

Roughly 4 years later, on March 10, 1989, Baker's successor, Nicholas F. Brady, revealed his plan for dealing with the debt crisis to the Brookings Institution and the Bretton Woods Committee Conference on Third World Debt. In no uncertain terms, Secretary Brady stated that the U.S. government was going to continue pushing the reforms that began under the Baker Plan:

In 1985 we paused and took stock of our progress in addressing the problem. As a result of that review, together we brought forth a new strategy, centered on economic growth. This still makes sense . . . The experience of the past 4 years demonstrates that the fundamental principles of the current strategy remain sound: Growth is essential to the resolution of debt problems. Debtor nations will not achieve sufficient levels of growth without reform (Brady (1989), p. 116).

But in addition to the reforms, Secretary Brady explicitly called for debt relief. In sharp contrast to the words of his predecessor in Seoul 4 years earlier, Brady explicitly used the phrase "debt reduction" or "debt service reduction" 18 times in his speech. For example:

Let me reiterate that we believe that the fundamental principles of the current [Baker] strategy remain valid. However, we believe that the time has come for all members of the international community to consider . . . debt and debt service reduction on a voluntary basis . . . The path toward greater creditworthiness and a return to the markets for many debtor countries needs to involve debt reduction (Brady (1989), pp. 117–118).

In a rare moment of consensus, U.S. politicians, the international banking fraternity, officials in debtor countries, and academics all agreed that the Brady Plan represented a continuation of the Baker Plan's commitment to reforms, with the important change that debt relief now had the official support of the United States Treasury.¹⁰

The historical record leaves little ambiguity about the fundamental similarity (reforms) and the key difference (debt relief) between the Baker Plan and the Brady Plan. Nevertheless, there are several potential concerns with our identification strategy. We will attempt to address these and other concerns in Section V, but first we turn to the basic empirical results.

IV. Formal Empirical Results

We evaluate the statistical significance of the relationships apparent in Figure 1 by estimating the following regression:

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_1 BRADY_{it} + \gamma_2 CONTROL_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

¹⁰ For example, see the reactions of Democratic Senators Bill Bradley (1989), Paul Sarbanes (1989), Former Mexican Finance Minister, Jesús Silva Herzog (1989), and Stanley Fischer (1989).

where R_{it} is the real return in dollars on country i 's stock market index in month t , $BRADY_{it}$ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in $[-12, 0]$. $CONTROL$ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in all of the control countries in Brady-Announcement months $[-12, 0]$. We also estimate $BRADY$ and $CONTROL$ using 9-month $[-9, 0]$, 6-month $[-6, 0]$, and 3-month $[-3, 0]$ windows. The country-specific intercepts allow for the possibility that average expected returns may differ across countries due to imperfect capital market integration.

Equation (1) constrains the coefficients on $BRADY$ to be the same across all months, which means that the parameter γ_1 measures the average monthly stock market response to all Brady Plan Announcements. Since the dummy variable for the event window is 12 months long, the total stock market response to debt relief for the Brady countries is given by 12 times the parameter estimate.

A different estimation technique would be to use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). This approach would have the advantage of providing a unique coefficient estimate for each country for each event. However, there are also disadvantages to this approach. The low power of hypothesis tests in unconstrained systems severely weakens the ability of the event study methodology to detect the impact of the event. Second, SUR requires a balanced panel. Due to the limited time series availability of stock market data, creating a balanced panel would result in discarding some of the 10 debt relief events. Given data limitations, the pooled cross-section time series framework seems appropriate.

With an unbalanced panel, it is not possible to relax the assumption of no contemporaneous correlation of the error term across countries. Therefore, we take indirect precautions. Specifically, three of the alternative regression specifications to equation (1) estimate abnormal returns relative to the world stock market index, U.S. stock market index, and finally IFC's emerging stock market index. Since all of the sample countries are emerging markets, the inclusion of a composite emerging market index as a right-hand-side variable will partially control for contemporaneously correlated disturbance terms. Including the emerging market index does not change the results.

A. Basic Results

The first row of Table III (Panel A)—labeled country-specific mean—gives the results from the baseline specification in equation (1). White standard errors are reported in parentheses. Column 1a shows that the coefficient on $BRADY$ for the 12-month window $[-12, 0]$ is 0.05 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Multiplying the coefficient by 12 gives the total effect, a 60% increase in the real dollar value of the stock market. Column 1b gives the coefficient estimate for the $CONTROL$ dummy. In contrast to the estimate for the $BRADY$ countries, the revaluation effect associated with the control group is economically weak, 0.004, and is statistically insignificant. Column 1c provides the p -value from a two-sided F -test of the hypothesis that the coefficient estimate on $BRADY$ is equal to the coefficient estimate on $CONTROL$. The p -value for this test is 0.001. The difference between the $BRADY$ estimate and

Table III

Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation Before Debt Relief Announcements.

The Control Countries Do Not

In Panel A, the estimation procedure used is ordinary least squares. In Panel B, the estimation procedure used is feasible generalized least squares. The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to July 1999 for all the countries in the Brady and control groups. Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, the Philippines, Venezuela, Colombia, Malaysia, and Pakistan; before December 1986 for Turkey; before December 1989 for Peru, Poland, Hungary, South Africa, and Sri Lanka; before September 1993 for Ecuador; and before December 1993 for the Czech Republic. The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns. *BRADY* is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for each month during a particular event window preceding a Brady Plan. *CONTROL* is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for each country in the control group during the months preceding Brady Plans. The column labeled 12-month window presents estimates of *BRADY* and *CONTROL* using an event window that begins 12 months prior to the announcement of the Brady Plan and ends with the announcement month. The analogous definition applies to the columns labeled 9-month window, 6-month window, and 3-month window. For each event window, six regression specifications are estimated. The first row presents estimates of *BRADY* and *CONTROL* using the benchmark specification that allows for country-specific intercept terms. Row 2 presents estimates using an alternative specification that allows for only a single intercept term. Row 3 presents estimates using the ICAPM specification that introduces the World stock return index as an additional explanatory variable. Row 4 presents estimates using the U.S. stock return index instead of the world stock index. Row 5 presents estimates using the LDC stock return index instead. Finally, row 6 presents estimates that use all three sets of indices simultaneously. The column labeled *Brady > control* shows the *p*-value for a test that the coefficient on *BRADY* is statistically larger than the coefficient on *CONTROL*.

Panel A: White-Corrected OLS Estimates												
	12-Month Window			9-Month Window			6-Month Window			3-Month Window		
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)	(4a)	(4b)	(4c)
Right-hand-side variables	<i>Brady</i>	<i>Control</i>	Brady > Control?	<i>Brady</i>	<i>Control</i>	Brady > Control?	<i>Brady</i>	<i>Control</i>	Brady > Control?	<i>Brady</i>	<i>Control</i>	Brady > Control?
Country-specific mean	0.050*** (0.014)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001	0.050*** (0.015)	0.010** (0.005)	0.011	0.048*** (0.016)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.041	0.048* (0.026)	0.009 (0.007)	0.15
Constant mean	0.049*** (0.013)	0.005 (0.004)	0.001	0.051*** (0.015)	0.009** (0.004)	0.005	0.049*** (0.016)	0.013*** (0.0045858)	0.022	0.045* (0.025)	0.006 (0.007)	0.13
World	0.047*** (0.014)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002	0.047*** (0.016)	0.009* (0.005)	0.023	0.045*** (0.016)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.080	0.049* (0.025)	0.004 (0.007)	0.09
United States	0.046*** (0.013)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.001	0.046*** (0.016)	0.007 (0.005)	0.018	0.043*** (0.016)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.076	0.048* (0.026)	0.004 (0.007)	0.10
LDLC	0.046*** (0.014)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.000	0.043*** (0.016)	0.001 (0.005)	0.011	0.039** (0.016)	0.005 (0.005)	0.0480	0.052** (0.024)	0.010 (0.007)	0.10
ALL	0.047*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.000	0.044*** (0.016)	0.002 (0.005)	0.011	0.039** (0.016)	0.005 (0.005)	0.0451	0.052** (0.025)	0.009 (0.007)	0.09

(continued)

Table III—Continued
Panel B: FGLS Estimates

	12-Month Window			9-Month Window			6-Month Window			3-Month Window		
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)	(4a)	(4b)	(4c)
Right-hand-side variables	<i>Brady</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Brady > Control?</i>	<i>Brady</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Brady > Control?</i>	<i>Brady</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Brady > Control?</i>	<i>Brady</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Brady > Control?</i>
Country-specific mean	0.041*** (0.010)	0.007 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.012** (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.051*** (0.013)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)	0.040* (0.019)	0.014** (0.006)	0.20 (0.20)
Constant mean	0.038*** (0.010)	0.008* (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.044*** (0.011)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.049*** (0.013)	0.015*** (0.006)	0.01 (0.01)	0.039** (0.019)	0.014** (0.006)	0.21 (0.21)
World	0.033*** (0.011)	0.003 (0.005)	0.015 (0.015)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.009* (0.005)	0.026 (0.023)	0.045*** (0.015)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.04 (0.04)	0.042** (0.022)	0.012** (0.006)	0.17 (0.17)
United States	0.032*** (0.011)	0.002 (0.005)	0.013 (0.013)	0.038*** (0.013)	0.008 (0.005)	0.023 (0.023)	0.045*** (0.015)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.03 (0.03)	0.042** (0.022)	0.010* (0.006)	0.14 (0.14)
LDC	0.034*** (0.012)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.012)	0.037*** (0.013)	0.001 (0.005)	0.010 (0.010)	0.043*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)	0.043** (0.021)	0.007 (0.006)	0.11 (0.11)
ALL	0.034*** (0.012)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.012)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.001 (0.005)	0.011 (0.011)	0.043*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.005)	0.02 (0.02)	0.042** (0.022)	0.006 (0.006)	0.10 (0.10)

White-corrected standard errors and standard errors are given in parentheses in Panels A and B, respectively. The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

the *CONTROL* estimate is statistically significant. In other words, the stock market in *BRADY* countries rises by roughly 60 percentage points more than it does in the *CONTROL* group.

The results using 9-month, 6-month, and 3-month windows are all consistent with the 12-month estimates. The coefficient estimate of *BRADY* ranges from 0.048 to 0.052 and is statistically significant in every specification. Furthermore, the *BRADY* estimate is always significantly larger than the estimate of *CONTROL* (except for the 3-month window). Row 2 of Table III (Panel A)—labeled constant mean—presents estimates of equation (1) using a constant intercept term, α , instead of country-specific intercept terms. The results are almost identical to those in row 1.

B. Controlling for World Stock Markets

Equation (1) provides a parsimonious baseline specification of abnormal returns, but it does not allow for the influence of world stock markets on local returns. In order to do so, we follow Kho, Lee, and Stulz (2000) and use the international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) to measure the expected return on each country's stock market index. Specifically, we now estimate:

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta R_t^W + \gamma_1 BRADY_{it} + \gamma_2 CONTROL_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

where R_t^W is the real return in dollars on the Morgan Stanley Capital Market Index (MSCI) in month t . While barriers to the international movement of capital may raise questions about the economic assumption of an ICAPM, as a purely statistical matter, returns on world stock market indexes do have some predictive power for stock returns in the countries under consideration.¹¹

Row 3 of Table III (Panel A) presents estimates of *BRADY* and *CONTROL* using equation (2). Row 4 presents estimates that use real U.S. stock returns, R_t^{US} , in place of R_t^W . Row 5 presents estimates that use the real dollar return on the IFC Emerging Market index, R_t^{LDC} , in place of R_t^W . Row 6 presents estimates that use all three sets of world stock returns simultaneously. The results in rows 3–6 perfectly mirror those under the benchmark specification in rows 1 and 2. The coefficient on *BRADY* is statistically significant under all four ICAPM specifications. The point estimate ranges from 5.2% to 3.9% per month, and the estimate of *BRADY* is significantly larger than the estimate of *CONTROL* in all but the 3-month window estimates.

C. Other Robustness Checks

The estimates in Panel A of Table III adjust for cross-country heteroskedasticity and cross-country correlation, but they do not account for potential serial

¹¹ For conceptual discussions of the ICAPM, see Frankel (1994) and Stulz (1999). For empirical evidence on the real effects of increased capital market integration, see Henry (2000b, 2003) and the references therein.

correlation in the error terms. Hence, White standard errors may not be sufficient to ensure the reliability of the estimates in Panel A. To address this concern, Panel B of Table III reestimates all of the specifications in Panel A using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). FGLS allows for the possibility of serial correlation, in addition to correcting for cross-country heteroskedasticity.

The estimations using FGLS in Panel B yield the same conclusions as the OLS estimates in Panel A. Every FGLS point estimate of *BRADY* in Panel B of Table III is statistically significant. The FGLS monthly point estimates of *BRADY* are smaller than those obtained using OLS, but they are still large. The smallest point estimate for the 12-month window is 0.032—a total revaluation of greater than 40%. Furthermore, the coefficient on *BRADY* remains significantly larger than the coefficient on *CONTROL* in all of the specifications except for some of those that use 3-month windows.

V. Alternative Explanations

Section IV establishes the statistical robustness of the central result: in anticipation of the announcement of debt relief agreements, there is an economically large and statistically significant increase in the stock market. There are, however, many possible interpretations of this fact. Section III argues that since markets are forward looking, stock prices in the debtor countries should have priced in the effect of economic reforms at the time of the Baker Plan. If the only “news” in the Brady Plan was the information about debt relief, then debt relief may plausibly be viewed as the proximate cause of the revaluation.

Plausibility, however, hangs on the validity of three key assumptions: (1) the market believed that the Baker Plan would lead to reforms; (2) the depth and scope of reforms under Brady were the same as those under Baker; and (3) the reforms went through as expected. Figure 3 leaves little doubt that market participants in debtor countries viewed the Baker Plan as a signal of future economic reforms—stock market values increased by an average of 22% in real dollar terms over the 12-month period preceding the Baker Plan.¹² So, the two key questions are: Were the depth and scope of the reforms the same under Baker and Brady? And did the reforms go through as anticipated? We now address each of these questions in turn.

A. Do Differences in Depth and Scope of Reforms Drive the Results?

If the Brady Plan called for structural changes that were not a part of the Baker Plan, then the Brady Plan could contain important new information about reforms. Therefore, the estimates in Section IV may be interpreted as the marginal effect of debt relief only if the reforms implemented under Baker were not radically different from those that continued under Brady.

¹² The countries represented in Figure 3 match the countries represented in Figure 1 almost perfectly. Jordan is the only country represented in Figure 1 that is not represented in Figure 3. This is because Jordan was not a Baker country.




Figure 3. Debtor-country stock prices rise in anticipation of reforms under the Baker Plan. The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage change. Zero is the month in which the Baker Plan was announced. The series in bold color is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real local currency return on a constant and 10 country-specific dummies (for the 11 Baker countries that later became Brady countries).

A careful reading of both Baker and Brady's speeches reveals no significant differences between the reforms advocated under each plan.¹³ In fact, the reforms were so similar that they came to be summarized as the "Washington Consensus" (Williamson (1990)).¹⁴ An exhaustive summary of the Washington Consensus is beyond the scope of this paper, but again, the central idea was that countries should stabilize inflation, privatize SOEs, liberalize trade, and permit greater foreign direct investment.

B. Did the Reforms Go through as Anticipated?

There may have been a consensus about the desired set of reforms, but the very need for a Brady Plan in addition to the Baker Plan suggests that at least some of the expected reforms did not go through as planned.¹⁵ If the countries

¹³ For example, see the remarks by Stanley Fischer (Fischer (1989, 1990)).

¹⁴ See also Fischer's comments on Williamson's paper (Fischer (1990)).

¹⁵ This is a complicated issue. The Baker Plan called for reforms, support from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and new money from the commercial banks. The Baker Plan assumed that the banks would be willing to lend new money as long as countries implemented reforms. This assumption turned out to be wrong. In spite of substantial reforms on the part of the debtors and IFI support, the banks were unwilling to extend new loans. There is a widely held view that the banks were unwilling to do so because of the existing debt overhang (Cline (1995)).

did not actually undertake the reforms they agreed to implement under the Baker Plan, then signing a Brady agreement could signal to the markets a new commitment to reform. Accordingly, the stock price increase in that case would reflect the expected effects of both reforms and debt relief.

If the Brady Plan contained new information about reforms, then a more accurate measure of the effect of debt relief might be the difference between the stock market reaction to the Brady Plan and the reaction to the Baker Plan. The reaction to the Brady Plan measures the effect only of debt relief and reforms; the stock market reaction to the Baker Plan measures the effect of reforms. Thus, in principle, the difference between the Baker revaluation depicted in Figure 3 (22 percentage points) and the Brady revaluation (60 percentage points) yields the marginal effect of debt relief.

But viewing the difference in the market's response to Baker and Brady as the marginal effect of debt relief is also not without problems. The expected effect of reform on the stock market is given by the benefit of reform conditional on success multiplied by the probability of success. Even assuming that the conditional benefit of a successful reform was the same under Baker and Brady, there may have been differing probabilities of success. For example, some observers argue that debt relief gave governments the capital they needed to push through further reforms with a populace that had grown weary with austerity measures and structural adjustment.¹⁶ If this is the case, then the difference between the stock market response to Baker and Brady reflects both the effect of debt relief and the higher probability of successful reforms under Brady.

C. Direct Controls for the Effect of Economic Reforms

We deal directly with the concern that economic reforms implemented around the time of the Brady Plan may still have contained some "news" by including dummy variables for reforms in all of our earlier regressions. There is sufficient heterogeneity in the timing of the economic reforms (Table II) to allow us to control directly for their effect on stock prices. To do so, we construct a series of reform dummies for each country: *TRADE*, *PRIVATIZE*, and *LIBERALIZE*. These variables take on the value 1 during the month a reform is announced and in each of the preceding 11 months. We then estimate the following regression:

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta R_t^W + \gamma_1 BRADY_{it} + \gamma_2 CONTROL_{it} + \gamma_3 TRADE_{it} + \gamma_4 PRIVATE_{it} + \gamma_5 LIBERALIZE_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (3)$$

Table IV presents the results. The coefficient on *BRADY* is significant at the 1% or 5% level for every window, and is significantly different from the coefficient on *CONTROL* in every specification. The results are also consistent with the view that stock prices incorporated the effect of economic reforms long before the Brady Plan was announced.

¹⁶ See the remarks by Herzog (1989) and Sarbanes (1989).

Table IV
After Controlling for Other Reforms, Brady Countries Experience a Significant Increase in Market Valuation before Debt Relief Announcements. The Control Countries Do Not

In Panel A, the estimation procedure is ordinary least squares. In Panel B, the estimation procedure used is feasible generalized least squares. The stock market data are monthly from December 1979 to July 1999 for all the countries in the *BRADY* and *CONTROL* groups. Stock market data are unavailable before December 1984 for Nigeria, the Philippines, Venezuela, Colombia, Malaysia, and Pakistan; before December 1986 for Turkey; before December 1989 for Indonesia; before December 1992 for Peru, Poland, China, Hungary, South Africa, and Sri Lanka; before September 1993 for Ecuador; and before December 1993 for the Czech Republic. The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns. *BRADY* is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for each month during a particular event window preceding a Brady Plan. Four different event windows are utilized. The column labeled 12-month window presents estimates of *BRADY* and *CONTROL* using an event window that begins 12 months prior to the announcement of the Brady Plan and ends with the announcement month. The analogous definition applies to the columns labeled 9-month window, 6-month window, and 3-month window. *CONTROL* is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for each country in the control group during the months preceding Brady Plans. *PRIVATIZE*, *TRADE*, and *LIBERALIZE* are dummy variables that take on the value 1 during the event window preceding a privatization, trade liberalization, and stock market liberalization, respectively. For each event window, two regression specifications are estimated. The world return model column presents estimates of *BRADY*, *CONTROL*, *PRIVATIZE*, *TRADE*, and *LIBERALIZE* using the ICAPM specification that introduces the world stock return index as an additional explanatory variable. The constant mean column presents estimates using the specification that allows for only a single intercept term. The column labeled Brady > Control shows the *p*-value for a test that the coefficient on Brady is statistically larger than the coefficient on control.

	Panel A: White-Corrected OLS Estimates									
	World Return Model					Constant-Mean Return Model				
	12-Month Window	9-Month Window	6-Month Window	3-Month Window	12-Month Window	9-Month Window	6-Month Window	3-Month Window		
Brady	0.048*** (0.012)	0.049*** (0.013)	0.047*** (0.016)	0.054** (0.023)	0.048*** (0.012)	0.048*** (0.013)	0.046*** (0.015)	0.053** (0.022)		
Control	0.003 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.012** (0.006)	0.009 (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)	0.009** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.010 (0.007)		
Brady > Control?	0.000	0.003	0.03	0.07	0.000	0.004	0.040	0.070		
Privatize	0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.016)	0.011 (0.018)	0.022 (0.028)	0.005 (0.014)	0.010 (0.015)	0.012 (0.018)	0.023 (0.027)		
Trade	-0.013 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.018)	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.052 (0.033)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.001 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.021)	-0.048 (0.032)		
Liberalize	0.009 (0.016)	0.025 (0.018)	0.051** (0.021)	0.094*** (0.033)	0.013 (0.016)	0.029 (0.018)	0.057*** (0.021)	0.101*** (0.032)		

(continued)

Table IV—Continued

	Panel B: FGLS Estimates									
	World Return Model					Constant-Mean Return Model				
	12-Month Window	9-Month Window	6-Month Window	3-Month Window		12-Month Window	9-Month Window	6-Month Window	3-Month Window	
<i>BRADY</i>	0.033*** (0.011)	0.039*** (0.012)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.045** (0.021)		0.037*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.011)	0.048*** (0.013)	0.039** (0.019)	
<i>CONTROL</i>	0.004 (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)	0.0127*** (0.004)	0.012** (0.006)		0.008* (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.015*** (0.005)	0.014** (0.006)	
Brady > Control?	0.012 (0.012)	0.014 (0.014)	0.022 (0.016)	0.130 (0.024)		0.01 (0.002)	0.01 (0.003)	0.01 (0.016)	0.206 (0.023)	
<i>PRIVATIZE</i>	−0.001 (0.012)	−0.002 (0.014)	0.002 (0.016)	0.002 (0.024)		−0.002 (0.012)	−0.003 (0.013)	0.001 (0.016)	0.002 (0.023)	
<i>TRADE</i>	−0.011 (0.020)	−0.001 (0.022)	−0.005 (0.026)	−0.068* (0.039)		−0.005 (0.020)	0.006 (0.023)	0.002 (0.027)	−0.061 (0.040)	
<i>LIBERALIZE</i>	0.0138 (0.020)	0.021 (0.022)	0.040 (0.026)	0.078** (0.039)		0.021 (0.020)	0.029 (0.023)	0.049* (0.027)	0.089** (0.040)	

White-corrected standard errors are given in parentheses in Panel A.

The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Stock market liberalizations are the only economic reform implemented around the time of the Brady Plan that have any effect on the markets. It is no coincidence that stock market liberalizations are also the only reform in our regression that was not a part of the Washington Consensus. The Baker Plan called for the liberalization of foreign direct investment; liberalization of portfolio equity investment is not directly mentioned. In other words, stock market liberalizations were a surprise.

Because every debt relief agreement coincides closely with an IMF agreement, we cannot disentangle the debt relief effect by inserting into equation (3) a dummy variable for IMF programs that coincide with debt relief announcements. An IMF dummy constructed in that way would be collinear with the *BRADY* dummy and present the attendant econometric problems. Therefore, we adopt a different tack. We examine whether the stock market responds to IMF agreements that are not accompanied by debt relief.

We do so by constructing for each country a list of all IMF programs that did not occur within a year (before or after) of the announcement of its Brady agreement. We then create a dummy variable, *IMFPROGRAM*, which takes on the value 1 for all such programs, and estimate the following regression:

$$R_{it} = \alpha + \beta R_t^W + \gamma_1 IMFPROGRAM_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (4)$$

Following the earlier specifications, we estimate 12-month, 9-month, 6-month, and 3-month windows. If the stock market responds positively to IMF agreements that are not accompanied by debt relief, then the estimate of γ_1 should be positive and significant.

There is no evidence that the stock market responds positively to IMF agreements that are not associated with a Brady debt relief agreement. The coefficient estimate of *IMFPROGRAM* is negative and statistically insignificant in every specification. The estimate for the 12-month window is -0.016 ; the estimate for the 9-month window is -0.011 ; the estimate for the 6-month window is -0.004 ; and the estimate for the 3-month window is -0.027 .¹⁷

VI. Why Do Market Values Rise?

Do the debtor-country stock price increases reflect an irrational exuberance about the efficacy of debt relief? Or do they rationally forecast important subsequent changes in the countries' economic fundamentals? Theory points to three pieces of data that can help answer the question: the NRT, investment, and growth.

The NRT is the net flow of real resources into a country. In theory, developing countries should experience positive NRTs, as the rate of return in these

¹⁷ The insignificance of the *IMFPROGRAM* variable is consistent with evidence that the market responds positively to IMF agreements only when they are announced in the midst of high inflation (Henry (2002)).

countries should be higher than in rich countries. However, the NRT may suddenly turn negative if adverse shocks or poor economic management drive creditors to call in existing loans and make potential new creditors unwilling to lend.

Because the government pays its external debt by taxing domestic firms and households, the private sector's expected future tax burden increases sharply when the country's NRT suddenly turns negative. The higher future tax burden discourages investment and results in creditors being able to recover less than they would if some of the debt was forgiven. By reducing the implicit marginal tax rate on expected future cash flows, debt relief can remove the debt overhang, thereby restoring positive NRTs, investment, and growth (Krugman (1989), Sachs (1989)).

A. Is There a Change in NRT, Investment, and Growth?

Table V reveals a clear association between the Brady debt restructuring and changes in the sign of the NRT. In every one of the years from $[-18, -9]$, the median NRT to the Brady countries is positive. At the onset of the Debt Crisis (roughly year -7), the NRT turns negative and remains so until the Brady Plan (year 0). After the Brady Plan, the NRT turns positive and remains so for the rest of the sample. The table also shows that the change in the sign of the NRT occurs uniformly across almost all Brady countries.¹⁸

Figure 4 shows that there was also an investment boom in the aftermath of the Brady Plan. In the 5 years prior to debt relief, the average growth rate of the capital stock in the Brady countries was 1.6% per year. In the 5 years following debt relief, the capital stock grew at a rate of 3.5% per year.

Figure 5 demonstrates that growth rates of GDP per capita also increased. The Brady countries experience abnormally high growth rates in each of the 5 years following the Brady Plan. There is no significant change in the average growth rate of the control group.

B. Does the Stock Market Rationally Forecast the Changes?

We also examine whether the stock market predicts the change in NRT and growth. Table VI demonstrates a strong correlation between the sign of the cumulative abnormal return on a country's stock market and the change in the sign of the NRT. In 9 of 10 countries, the sign of the cumulative abnormal return matches the change in the sign of the NRT.

Table VI also shows a strong correlation between the sign of a country's cumulative abnormal return on a country's stock market and the sign of its growth deviation. In 9 of 10 countries, the sign of the cumulative abnormal return matches the sign of abnormal GDP growth in the year following the Brady Plan. In 9 of 10 countries, the sign of the cumulative abnormal return

¹⁸ In Poland, the NRT turned positive in 1991—before its debt relief plan was unveiled. However, following Poland's plan, there was a threefold increase in the level of NRT.

Table V
The Brady Plan Reverses the Sign of the Net Resource Transfer (Millions of US\$)

Net resource transfers are equal to net resource flows minus interest payments on long-term loans and foreign direct investment profits. The first column lists the years in event time. The number 0 represents the year in which each country's Brady Plan was announced. For *CONTROL* group countries, 0 represents 1989. The next two columns show the progression of NRTs in event time to the *CONTROL* group and the *BRADY* group. The next five columns show the progression of the NRTs to individual Brady stock market countries in event time. The data on NRTs are obtained from the World Bank's Global Development Finance Data Base.

Year	<i>CONTROL</i> Median	<i>BRADY</i> Median	Arg	Brazil	Ecuador	Jordan	Mexico	Nigeria	Peru	Phil	Poland	Ven
-18	91	10	-86	5,586	10	466	100	-725	211	-42	NA	-535
-17	143	123	-568	3,968	484	471	132	-519	-328	123	NA	-1,036
-16	116	382	613	4,618	382	490	1,188	-468	-406	-20	NA	-1,760
-15	104	285	-358	4,572	285	547	1,747	-640	-580	295	NA	-527
-14	124	495	495	6,869	349	1,342	2,418	-411	-479	510	NA	-428
-13	220	1,371	3,372	1,858	704	1,348	3,112	1,303	712	986	2,346	1,393
-12	100	1,063	1,593	-844	-905	1,272	3,285	830	854	807	1,500	1,442
-11	347	847	4,436	1,867	-432	1,055	2,433	-1,354	440	639	213	2,700
-10	505	297	3,231	-410	-207	997	1,136	758	-84	547	-546	47
-9	648	-43	-1,197	-3,614	-399	777	3,043	1,445	167	489	-324	-253
-8	594	146	-3,454	-1,074	28	687	7,490	700	263	729	-317	-1,475
-7	403	-419	-1,330	-6,550	85	867	542	-1,426	153	561	-1,437	-923
-6	330	-1,679	-2,971	-7,100	-63	745	-5,658	-2,290	203	865	-1,067	-2,550
-5	529	-833	-2,629	-7,066	18	496	-8,666	-514	243	72	-1,152	-2,486
-4	189	-229	-1,729	-7,229	-251	808	-9,452	95	-206	224	-202	-3,856
-3	84	-767	-1,412	-8,948	-354	853	-6,443	-1,180	228	-263	2,753	-4,276
-2	-71	-578	-2,571	-3,952	-377	410	-1,485	1,414	2,155	-779	1,163	-3,483
-1	-10	-283	528	-496	231	-70	-7,443	-1,799	4,460	-655	2,180	-1,927
0	187	-54	2,917	5,026	67	-222	-7,553	-1,473	3,723	-175	2,176	-2,283
1	366	2,372	11,975	10,913	144	39	5,364	-2,277	3,946	51	6,437	797
2	998	1,216	7,794	3,469	278	333	4,798	351	2,080	-272	4,804	206
3	1,173	1,125	6,122	7,217	555	70	1,699	631	1,618	-844	6,169	-1,280
4	2,675	2,267	13,205	18,474	-169	610	13,114	-372	2,160	2,374	7,943	-1,836
5	2,197	1,422	12,793	24,250	156	208	11,235	-691	550	2,293	8,317	-1,811




Figure 4. Investment in debtor countries surges following the Brady Plan. The variable on the y-axis is the percentage change in capital stock. Zero is the year in which the debt relief plan was announced. The series in bold color is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the capital stock growth rate from all 16 Brady countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies. The series in light color is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the capital stock growth rate from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies.

matches the sign of the cumulative abnormal GDP growth for the period $[0, +2]$ and similarly in 8 of the 10 countries for the period $[0, +5]$.

C. What Happens in the Long Run?

Ongoing commitment to economic reforms is essential for the long-run effectiveness of debt restructuring agreements. Figure 6 illustrates the point. In the three countries in which reforms temporarily stalled—Jordan, Nigeria, and the Philippines—the initial rise in stock market valuations disappears within a year.

More generally, it is interesting to ask how stock markets in the Brady countries perform relative to the control group in the years subsequent to the Brady Plan. The average 3- and 5-year return on the stock market in the Brady countries exceeds that of the control group. Statistical inference about stock returns over long horizons in volatile markets is a thorny task. Accordingly, we make no attempt to do so. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the overall pattern of longer-run stock market performance of the Brady countries relative to their control group counterpart is not inconsistent with the investment and growth profiles (Figures 4 and 5).




Figure 5. GDP growth in the debtor countries increases following debt relief. The variable on the y-axis is the abnormal percentage deviation from the trend growth rate. Zero is the year in which the debt relief plan was announced. The series in bold color is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the real GDP growth rate from all 16 Brady countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies. The series in light color is a plot of the residuals from a panel regression of the real GDP growth rate from 16 control group countries on a constant and 15 country-specific dummies.

VII. Do the Results Reflect a Wealth Transfer to the Countries from the Banks?

The results suggest that debt relief generates large wealth gains for the debtor countries, but it is important to ask whether these gains came at the expense of the western commercial banks and their shareholders. Figure 2 suggests that debt relief is not a zero-sum game, but we now examine the result more thoroughly. Since Figure 2 is based on numbers from 11 commercial banks, we begin by checking whether a large stock price increase for one or two banks drives the result.¹⁹ All 11 commercial banks experienced stock price increases that were larger than their median 12-month stock price increase. The probability of this occurring randomly is 0.0005%.

We also check the result by running a series of panel regressions. The specifications are identical to those used in Tables III and IV, with two important

¹⁹ The 11 highly exposed commercial banks are Bank of America, Bank of New York, Bankers Trust, Chase, Chemical, Citibank, Continental, First Chicago, First Pennsylvania, JP Morgan, and Manufacturers Hanover (see Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1993)).

Table VI
The Stock Market Forecasts Future Changes in the Net Resource Transfer and GDP Growth

This table presents the correlation between increases in market valuation before Brady Plan announcements and changes in NRTs and GDP growth afterward. The first column lists the Brady stock market countries. The Brady stock market countries are the countries in the Brady group with available stock market data as displayed in Table I. The second column identifies the countries that experienced abnormal stock market returns over the 12 months preceding their Brady Plan announcements. The third column identifies the countries that experienced changes from negative NRT to positive NRT in the year preceding or during the 2 years following the announcement. The fourth column identifies the countries that experienced abnormal GDP growth in the year of the announcement. The fifth and sixth columns identify those that experienced abnormal growth in the 1st and 2nd year after the announcement. Finally, the seventh and eighth columns identify the countries that experienced abnormal cumulative GDP growth during the 2 and 5 years following the announcement of the Brady Plan. The + sign denotes positive identification of a country.

	Stock Market Deviation Anticipating Debt Relief	Change in the Net Resource Transfer	Growth Deviation: Year [0]	Growth Deviation: Year [+1]	Growth Deviation: Year [+2]	Cumulative Growth Deviation: Year [0, +2]	Cumulative Growth Deviation: Year [0, +5]
Argentina	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brazil	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
Ecuador	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Jordan	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
Mexico	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Nigeria	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Peru	-	No change in sign	+	+	+	+	+
Philippines	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Poland	+	No change in sign*	+	+	+	+	+
Venezuela	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

* Following the Brady Plan in Poland there is no change in the sign of NRT, but the level of NRT almost triples.




Figure 6. The stock market gains evaporate in countries that do not stick to reforms. The variable on the y-axis is the continuously compounded abnormal percentage change. Zero is the month in which the debt relief plan was announced. The series in bold color is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from seven reformer Brady countries with stock market data available (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Poland, and Venezuela) on a constant and six country-specific dummies. The series in light color is a plot of the cumulative residuals from a panel regression of the real dollar return from three nonreformer Brady countries with stock market data available (Jordan, Nigeria, and Philippines) on a constant and two country-specific dummies.

differences. First, instead of debtor-country stock returns on the left-hand side, we now have a panel of monthly stock returns of 20 U.S. commercial banks: 11 that have significant LDC loan exposure and 9 that do not. Second, the two dummy variables are now *EXPOSED* and *NONEXPOSED*. For each of the 11 U.S. commercial banks with heavy LDC loan exposure, the variable *EXPOSED* takes on the value 1 during the 12-month window preceding the official Brady announcement in March 1989 and is 0 otherwise. The variable *NONEXPOSED* is analogously defined for the nine banks without LDC loan exposure.

All regressions were estimated using robust standard errors. The results confirm the picture. The coefficient on *EXPOSED*—the monthly abnormal return associated with the Brady Plan—ranges from 0.025 to 0.027 in alternative specifications and is significant at the 1% confidence level. Multiplying the coefficient estimate of 0.025 by 12 gives a total abnormal return of 30%, which is consistent with the magnitude in Figure 2. The coefficient on *NONEXPOSED* is statistically and economically insignificant in almost every specification.

Having confirmed the statistical significance of Figure 2, it is useful to consider the net wealth effect of the Brady Plan—the sum of the benefits to shareholders less any costs of implementing the plan.

On the benefit side, the total market capitalization of debtor-country stock markets rose by a total of \$42 billion. Importantly, 42 billion represents only the wealth effect on the publicly traded corporate sector, which constitutes a relatively small fraction of economic activity in these countries. Since debt relief seems to have positive effects on the rest of the economy (see Section VI), \$42 billion probably underestimates the total benefit to the debtor countries. Similarly, because we do not have data on the Japanese, German, and British banks that had significant LDC exposure, the \$13.3 billion increase in the market capitalization of U.S. banks probably understates the total wealth gains to developed country shareholders. Hence, a conservative estimate suggests that the Brady Plan generated a \$55.3 billion wealth increase of which 42 billion accrued to shareholders in the debtor countries and 13.3 billion went to the creditors.

On the cost side, banks received \$25 billion of enhancements in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds—collateral for principal and a rolling fund to cover several interest payments (Cline (1995), chapter 5). The debtor countries paid for the Treasury securities with loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Since the Bank and the IMF needed a member-country-financed capital injection to make these loans, it could be argued that the \$25 billion figure represented a real cost to member-country taxpayers. On the other hand, Cline argues that the Bank and the Fund "...lent at rates that reflect at least opportunity cost of Treasury bonds ... so that the public sector is not providing concessional financing ... the public sector enhancements did not cost anything" (Cline, p. 265). Whatever estimate one chooses to accept—\$25 billion or zero—the cost of the Brady Deal was less than the wealth effect.

VIII. Conclusion

Understanding why the Brady Plan produced rising asset prices, increased investment, and faster growth is pivotal to understanding the circumstances under which debt relief can be expected to yield efficiency gains. The Brady Plan worked because debt relief was the appropriate policy response for a group of middle-income developing countries where debt overhang genuinely stood in the way of profitable new lending and investment. Hence, the key questions for the current debate over collective action clauses and sovereign debt restructuring would seem to be the following: (1) how do you determine if a country suffers from debt overhang? and (2) will allowing a debtor country to unilaterally invoke a restructuring procedure yield the same kinds of benefits that were achieved under the multilateral framework of the Brady Plan?

While the evidence suggests that there can be large net gains to writing down the debt of middle-income developing countries, it is not clear that the results can be used to forecast the potential impact of debt relief on the world's highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs). For instance, debt relief may not yield efficiency

gains for the HIPCs, because it is not obvious that they suffer from debt overhang. Instead, the more conspicuous obstacle to investment and growth in the world's poorest countries seems to be weak economic institutions and infrastructure (Arslanalp and Henry (2004)).

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